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Notes on a "G-String":
A Study of the "No Man's
Land" of Labor Law
In this article, Professor McCoid discusses the recent Su-
preme Court decision in the Garmon case, which closed one
loophole to the "no mars land" in labor regulation, and the
legislative "solution?" of the no mans land problem. He
raises questions concerning the wisdom of the Court's refusal
to permit state courts and agencies to act where the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board declined to exercise its juris-
diction over businesses affecting commerce, and analyzes
some of the problems which the recent legislation may




ON April 20, 1959, the Supreme Court of the United States
handed down the latest in a series of decisions dealing with the
power of the federal and state governments to regulate labor-
management relations, a series which might well be categorized
as the "G-String" since four of the most significant decisions in the
series were Garner v. Teamsters Union,' Guss v. Utah Labor Re-
lations Bd.,2 International Assn of Machinists v. Gonzales,3 and
the most recent case, the second decision in San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon.4 Three of these, Garner, Guss and Garmon,
resulted in the development by the summer of 1959 of a "no man's
land," in which the federal labor act was apparently applicable
because the industry or labor dispute "affected commerce," but
the NLRB declined to exercise its jurisdiction for budgetary or
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. The author wishes to express his
indebtedness to Dean William Lockhart and Professors Kenneth Culp Davis and John
J. Cound of the University of Minnesota Law School, who read this Article during its
preparation and whose comments were of great assistance.
1. 346 U.S. 485 (1958).
2. 858 U.S. 1 (1957).
8. 856 U.S. 617 (1958).
4. 859 U.S. 286 (1959). The earlier decision, 858 U.S. 26 (1957), was a com-
panion to the Guss decision.
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other reasons, and the state courts or labor agencies were almost
entirely excluded from exercising jurisdiction. As a result, em-
ployers, employees, and labor organizations were left without ef-
fective regulation of their relations and without protection against
abuse of the labor-management relation by other parties. To com-
plete the alliterative assembly of authority in this area, we now
have a new piece of pertinent federal legislation, which had as its
respective legislative sponsors Senator Goldwater and Representa-
tives Landrum and Griffin. 5
In undertaking a discussion of the problem of the no man's land
and federal pre-emption of regulation in the field of labor law, the
author faces the not too pleasant challenge that the development
of law in this area has been fully documented and that the policy
considerations which underlie any rational decision concerning the
extent of federal pre-emption in the labor law field have already
been extensively considered by others for whose opinion he has
great respect.6 What follows, therefore, is merely intended as a
comment on two recent developments in the area, the second de-
cision of the Supreme Court in the Garmon case 7 and the enact-
ment of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959 (hereinafter referred to as LMRDA). The discussion which
follows is a bifurcated one: first, an analysis of the second Gar-
mon decision in terms of the background of prior, relevant Supreme
Court decisions, the reasoning of the members of the Court in
Garmom itself, and the probable consequences of the decision had
no legislation intervened; second, a description of the legislative
development from the Wagner Act through the most recent labor
5. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519, U.S.
CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 2953 (Supp. XIV, Sept. 14, 1959), which is cited here-
after merely by reference to the section in LMRDA. While the "Administration"
bill introduced by Senator Goldwater of Arizona and others failed to pass the Senate,
its provisions dealing with the no man's land were substantially incorporated into
the successful Landrum-Grifin Bill in the House and are now incorporated in LMRDA
§ 701(a). Even if the labor reform act should ultimately be identified with Senator
Kennedy, its treatment of the no man's land is so opposed to Senator Kennedy's own
proposals that he can hardly be classified as one of its sponsors.
6. Articles on federal pre-emption in the area of labor relations have been fre-
quent, the most helpful of which have appeared to be: Cox, Federalism in the Law
of Labor Relations, 67 HAIIv. L. REv. 1297 (1954); Cox & Seidman, Federalism and
Labor Relations, 64 HAIv. L. REv. 211 (1950); Isaacson, Labor Relations Law:
Federal Versus State Jurisdiction, 42 A.B.A.J. 415 (1956); Meltzer, The Supreme
Court, Congress and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations, 59 CoLum. L. REV. 6,
269 (1959); Wellington, Labor and the Federal System, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 542
(1959).
7. On its initial appearance before the Court, as a companion case with Guss, the
Court divided only 6 to 2 in favor of denying the state court the power to issue an
injunction against stranger picketing for recognition and a union shop contract,
and remanding the question of the state courts power to give damages under
state law. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
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reform act, with comments on the probable consequences of the
most recent provisions.
I. Tnm SuPREmm CouRTT's CONTEIUTEON TO THE No MAN's LAND
A. The Background to Gannon II
The no man's land arose from a combination of two lines of de-
velopment: the doctrine of federal pre-emption of regulation over
interstate commerce and the practice of the NLRB of declining
to exercise the full jurisdiction given it by the National Labor Re-
lations Act of 1935 (hereinafter referred to as the NLRA) and the
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (hereinafter referred to
as the LMBA). Of course, federal pre-emption is not a doctrine
peculiar to labor law. It arises from the supremacy clause of the
Constitution 8 and was originally developed in cases involving reg-
ulation of commerce in a rather restricted sense. As summarized
in a 1942 case, Cloverleaf Co. v. Patterson:
[T]he scope of Congressional power is such that it may override the
exercise of state power and render impossible its application to petitioner's
manufacturing processes. . . . Nor is this power limited to situations
where national uniformity is so essential that, lacking Congressional per-
mission, all state action is inadmissible notwithstanding a complete ob-
sence of federal legislation. Exclusive federal regulation may arise, also,
from the exercise of the power of Congress over interstate commerce
where, in the absence of Congressional action, the states may themselves
legislate. It has long been recognized that, in those fields of commerce
where national uniformity is not essential, either the state or federal
government may act. . . . Where this power to legislate exists, it often
happens that there is only a partial exercise of that power by the fed-
eral government. In such cases the state may legislate freely upon those
phases of the commerce which are left unregulated by the nation. But
where the United States exercises its power of legislation so as to conflict
with a regulation of the state, either specifically or by implication, the
state legislation becomes inoperative and the federal legislation ex-
clusive in its application. 9
As the Court has pointed out more than once,10 Congress, in
8. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof .. . shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
9. 315 U.S. 148, 154-56 (1942). A discussion of the "occupation of the field"
is to be found in Note, "Occupation of the Field" in Commerce Clause Cases,
1926-1946: Ten Years of Federalism, 60 Hnv. L. REv. 262 (1946), in which
reference is made to the early pre-emption oases in the labor field, Hill v. Florida
ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) and Allen-Bradley Local 1111, UEW v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
10. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241 (1959); LAM
v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958); Garner v. Teamsters Union, Local 776,
346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953).
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taking hold of the problem of labor-management relations, has
left something to the states, but the extent of that something has
been a matter of dispute for more than a decade. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter has likened the congressional intent in this regard to
the Oracle of Delphi,1 but at times it appears that the oracles may
sit not upon Capitol Hill but behind the bench of our highest
court. This refers not merely to the recognition that "congressional
intent" is frequently a construction of the Justices based on only
partially formulated policies of the legislators. It also refers to the
fact that those of us who thought we detected the drift of the
oracles in UAW v. Russell-2 and Gonzales away from the all-em-
bracing federal pre-emption doctrine were trapped by words rather
than deeds. For what the Court, or five members thereof, now say
about the scope of federal and state power sounds somewhat awry
from what we thought we heard the year before.
Looked at in terms of the actual facts with which the Court was
dealing in each case, the series of holdings from Hill v. Florida13
(or possibly from Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Bd.14 ) to Garmon II formed a pattern consistent
with the position of the majority in the latter case:
(1) The federal government had completely foreclosed state ac-
tion in dealing adversely with conduct which the federal
law protects ' and in conducting a representation and cer-
tification procedure paralleling that of the NLRA. 16
(2) Similarly, the federal government had foreclosed state action
to restrain conduct which is prohibited by the federal law.'7
11. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241 (1959);
IAM v. Gonzales, 856 U.S. 617, 619 (1958).
12. 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
13. 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
14. 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
15. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (peaceful picketing);
Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Ry. Employees, Div. 998 v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951) (strike in public utility forbidden by state law
requiring compulsory arbitration); UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950) (strike
without complying with state law requiring notice of intent and majority vote);
Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) (organization of union).
16. La Crosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 18
(1949); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767
(1947).
17. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957) (minority
union picketing for recognition of closed shop); Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local
427 v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957) (minority picketing for recogni-
tion of secondary boycott); Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957)
(interference with and coercion of employees by employer); Weber v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955) (jurisdictional dispute and secondary boycott);
Garner v. Teamsters Union, Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) (minority union picket-
ing for recognition); Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd., 838 U.S. 953 (1950) (discharge under unlawful closed shop).
[Vol. 44:205
NO MAN'S LAND
(3) The foreclosure applied even though the applicable federal
agency, the NLRB, declined to make full use of the federal
power to regulate labor-management relations.'8
(4) The states retained the power to prevent or remedy injuries
resulting from violence, a threat of violence or other breach
of the peace, or an obstruction of public streets. 9
(5) The states retained power to act where the conduct was not
a concern of the federal law, being neither protected conduct
nor prohibited.20
However, looked at in terms of rationale apparently put forward
by the Court, the import of the cases is not so clear. True, the
language of the Court in Hill v. Florida,2' stated fairly clearly the
barrier about "protected" activity. True also, the language of the
unanimous Court in Garner forecast the consequences in each of
the other cases:
Congress has taken in hand this particular type of controversy where
it affects interstate commerce .... It is not necessary or appropriate
for us to surmise how the National Labor Relations Board might have
decided this controversy had petitioners presented it to that body. The
power and duty of primary decision lies with the Board, not with us....
Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be
enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties.
It went on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules
to a specific and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular
procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, and hearing and de-
cision, including judicial relief pending a final administrative order. Con-
gress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially
designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its
substantive rules and to avoid those diversities and conflicts likely to
result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor con-
troversies. . . . A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures
are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as
are different rules of substantive law. The same reason which prohibits
federal courts from intervening in such cases, except by way of review
or on application of the federal Board, precludes state courts from
doing so. 22
18. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957); Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters, Local 427 v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957); Cuss
v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
19. UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (mass picketing, threats, and intimida-
tion); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (threats and incitement
to violence); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956)
(Kohler case); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656
(1954); Allen-Bradley Local 1111, UEW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942) (mass picketing and violence).
20. IAM v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958) (expulsion from union and refusal
to refer); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949)
(Briggs-Stratton case) ("quickie" work stoppages).
21. 325 U.S. 538, 542 (1945).
22. 346 U.S. at 488-91.
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But Garner was soon followed by United Constr. Workers v. La-
burnum, 23 in which the language of the Court was focused less
upon the nature of the acts involved (threats of violence and in-
timidation) than upon the disparity of remedies:
In the Garner case, Congress had provided a federal administrative
remedy, supplemented by judicial procedure for its enforcement, with
which the state injunctive procedure conflicted. Here Congress has neither
provided nor suggested any substitute for the traditional state court pro-
cedure for collecting damages for injuries caused by tortious conduct.
For us to cut off the injured respondent from this right of recovery will
deprive it of its property without recourse or compensation. To do so will,
in effect, grant petitioners immunity from liability for their tortious con-
duct. We see no substantial reason for reaching such a result.24
To the extent that Congress prescribed preventive procedure against
unfair practices, that case [Garner] recognized that the Act excluded
conflicting state procedure to the same end. To the extent, however, that
Congress has not prescribed procedure for dealing with the consequences
of tortious conduct already committed, there is no ground for concluding
that existing criminal penalties or liabilities for tortious conduct have
been eliminated. The care we took in the Garner case to demonstrate the
existing conflict between state and federal administrative remedies in that
case was, itself, a recognition that if no conflict existed, the state pro-
cedure would have survived.25
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined in this opin-
ion, but the dissenting Justices, Douglas and Black, reiterated the
doctrine of Garner.26 Four years later, in the Russell case, the ma-
jority of the Court drew the same distinction as it had drawn in
the Laburnum case. Surprisingly, the Russell majority included
Justices Frankfurter and Brennan, who a year later were to join
the Chief Justice and Justices Black and Douglas in forming the
"majority" in Garmon II, which classified Russell and Laburnum
as decided primarily on the basis of the traditional power of states
over violence, intimidation, and breaches of the peace. But even
more surprising, and perhaps misleading in light of Garmon I, was
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Gonzales in which, although
indicating that the Taft-Hartley Act had specifically negated any
intention to control the membership qualifications of unions, he
noted the possibility of a violation of section 8(b) (2) and placed
primary emphasis on the absence of a "full remedy" under the
Board's procedures:
If, as we held in the Laburnum case, certain state causes of action
sounding in tort are not displaced simply because there may be an argu-
mentative coincidence in the facts adducible in the tort action and a
28. 847 U.S. 656 (1954).
24. Id. at 663-64.
25. Id. at 665.
26. Id. at 669-671.
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plausible proceeding before the National Labor Relations Board, a state
remedy for breach of contract also ought not be displaced by such evi-
dentiary coincidence when the possibility of conflict with federal policy
is similarly remote. The possibility of conflict from the court's award
of damages in the present case is no greater than from its order that
respondent be restored to membership. In either case the potential con-
flict is too contingent, too remotely related to the public interest ex-
pressed in the Taft-Hartley Act, to justify depriving state courts of juris-
diction to vindicate the personal rights of an ousted union member. This
is emphasized by the fact that the subject matter of the litigation in
the present case, as the parties and the court conceived it, was the breach
of a contract governing the relations between respondent and his unions.
The suit did not purport to remedy or regulate union conduct on the
ground that it was designed to bring about employer discrimination
against an employee, the evil the Board is concerned to strike at as an
unfair labor practice under § 8(b) (2).27
The last quoted sentence is significant because one of the elements
of damage claimed by the plaintiff was the loss of wages resulting
from the failure of the union to refer him to jobs through its hiring
hall arrangements, conduct which might have given rise to an
NLRB order for back pay.2
In view of the Court's return in Garmon I1 to the position it had
assumed previously in Garner with respect to pre-emption gener-
ally, it is noteworthy that the unanimous Court suggested in Gar-
ner that the power of the states might be recognized if the con-
duct was "governable by the State or is entirely ungovernable,"
or if the NLRB should be shown to have declined for budgetary or
other reasons to exercise fully its granted power. 9 Yet, three years
after the Garner decision, in Guss and Garmon I, the majority of
the Court, including four of the Justices who had joined in Garner,
rejected the proposition that when the Board declines to exercise
its potential jurisdiction over a business or class of businesses be-
cause the effect upon commerce of a labor dispute in such business
is not sufficiently substantial to make such exercise of jurisdiction
effectuate the policies of the act,30 the state court or agency may
27. 356 U.S. at 621-22.
28. Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 847 U.S. 17 (1954); Born v. Laube, 213 F.2d
407 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 848 U.S. 855 (1954); NLRB v. Waterfront
Employers, 211 F.2d 946 (9th' Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Longshoremen's Union, 210
F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. F. H. McGraw & Co., 206 F.2d 635 (6th Cir.
1953); NLRB v. Jarka Corp., 198 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1952); Alaska Chapter of Ass'n
Gen. Contractors, 113 N.L.R.B. 41 (1955); Alaska S.S. Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 22 (1952).
29. 346 U.S. at 488.
30. It appears that the Board has never exercised its potential jurisdiction under
the federal act to the fullest extent. Before 1950, it declined to assert jurisdiction
in specific cases in which it felt that the business itself or the labor dispute in-
volved did not have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce. E.g., Herff Motor
Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 1007 (1947); Southwest Metals Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 54 (1947); Air-
line Bus Co., 64 N.L.R.B. 620 (1945). However, in some early cases this declina-
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properly step into the breach even without a formal cession of
jurisdiction under section 10(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act.31
Finally, in remanding Garmon to the California court instead
of reversing both the granting of an injunction and the judgment
for damages, the Court suggested that if there were a valid tort
claim under state law, the damage action might be sustained. After
pointing out that the California court erroneously had felt com-
pelled to apply federal law to the damage claim, the majority
added:
We cannot know that the California court would have interpreted its own
state law to allow an award of damages in this different situation. We
tion was phrased in terms of lack of evidence which would establish that the
labor dispute or question of representation did affect commerce. E.g., Yellow Cab
& Baggage Co., 17 N.L.R.B. 469 (1939); San Diego Ice & Cold Storage Co., 17
N.L.R.B. 422 (1939). In 1950, the Board issued a series of decisions in which
it announced for the first time some "jurisdictional yardsticks" in terms of the
monetary value of interstate sales and purchases, in an effort to standardize its
jurisdiction. See Hollow Tree Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 635 (1950) for the Board's
explanation, and 26 L.R.R.M. 50, 51 (1950) for a summary of the standards
promulgated. In 1954, the standards were revised, generally doubling the required
amount of interstate business for nonretail enterprises and setting up new and
much higher monetary standards for retail enterprises. See 34 L.R.R.M. 75-78
(1954). The majority of the Board asserted that the change in standards was moti-
vated by the limited budget and personnel of the Board, but Member Murdock indi-
cated in his dissent that the real motivation may have been a desire to decrease
the area of federal regulation and increase the potential area of state regulation
of labor relations. See Breeding Transfer Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 493 (1954). More
recently, in response to the Guss decision and after an increase in its budget, the
Board has broadened its jurisdiction considerably. See Siemons Mailing Serv., 122
N.L.R.B. No. 13, 43 L.R.R.M. 1056 (Nov. 14, 1958).
31. One might also point to the apparent inconsistency of position concerning the
significance of "public" versus "private" rights taken in Garner and subsequent
cases. In response to the argument that the Pennsylvania board, in Garner, had
been granting protection for private rights, whereas the NLRB deals only with
public rights, the unanimous Court first questioned the validity of such a dis-
tinction, and then proceeded to point out that even if there were a distinction
between the protection of public and private rights, the Pennsylvania Labor Act was
a declaration of public policy and undertook to protect "public" as well as "private"
rights. 346 U.S. at 494-98. Yet, the majority in Laburnum said: "The primarily
private nature of claims for damages under state law also distinguishes them in a
measure from the public nature of the regulation of future labor relations under
federal law." 347 U.S. at 665. (Emphasis added.) And in Gonzales, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter said: "The possibility of conflict from the court's award of damages
in the present case is no greater than from its order that respondent be restored
to membership. In either case the potential conflict is too contingent, too remotely
related to the public interest expressed in the Taft-Hartley Act, to justify depriving
state courts of jurisdiction to vindicate the personal rights of an ousted union mem-
ber." 356 U.S. at 621. (Emphasis added.) In Garmon II, Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
speaking for five members of the Court, returned to the Garner postion: "Even the
States' salutary effort to redress private wrongs or grant compensation for past harm
cannot be exerted to regulate activities that are potentially subject to the exclusive
federal regulatory scheme." In connection with this statement, the Court cited
the language from Garner dealing with private versus public rights. 359 U.S. at 247.
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therefore vacate the judgment and remand the case to the Supreme Court
of California for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion....32
B. Analysis of Garnon II
While the United States Supreme Court was still considering the
Gonzales and Russell cases, the California court again dealt with
Garmon.3 3 Following the lead suggested by the Supreme Court's
original opinion and the language of Laburnum emphasizing the
difference in remedy between the federal act and the state common
law tort doctrines, a majority of the California Supreme Court sus-
tained the award of damages on the following grounds: first, that
the conduct of the union violated the state civil code; 34 and second,
that the employer would have no comparable relief under the fed-
eral act, both because the NLRB does not grant compensatory dam-
ages to employers and because the Board had declined to exercise
jurisdiction over this dispute. Justice Traynor, joined in dissent by
two of his colleagues, 35 noted that three factors had been singled
out in prior decisions of other courts to distinguish Laburnum from
Garner: (1) claim for reparation or compensation rather than pre-
ventive relief; (2) violent conduct rather than peaceful picketing
and striking, and (3) recovery based on common law tort principles
rather than statutory regulations. However, these factors were not
themselves the ultimate tests of state jurisdiction, said Justice Tray-
nor, "but only indications of whether or not there is a likelihood of
conflict between federal and state policy." 36 He then proceeded to
assert that while no such conflict occurred in Laburnum because of
the violent nature of the conduct, there was no comparable assur-
32. 353 U.S. at 29.
33. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473
(1958).
34. The court relied upon a combination of the following statutes: CAL. Civ.
CODE § 1708:
Every person is bound, without contract, to abstain from injuring the person or
property of another, or infringing upon any of his rights.
CAL. LaB. CODE § 923:
[TIhe public policy of this state is declared as follows: Negotiations of terms
and conditions of labor should result from voluntary agreement between em-
ployer and employees .... [I]t is necessary that the individual workman have
full freedom of association, self organization, and designation of representatives
of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment,
and that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of em-
ployers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such represenatives or in
self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 1667:
That is not lawful which is . . . contrary to the policy of express law, though
not expressly prohibited. ...
35. 49 Cal. 2d at 615, 320 P.2d at 485 (dissenting opinion).
36. Id. at 618, 320 P.2d at 487.
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ance on the facts of the Garmon case that conflict with federal policy
would not result, since (1) damages are an effective means of en-
forcing policy and controlling conduct, and (2) nothing in the con-
duct of the defendants decisively indicates whether the NLRB
would regard it as subject to section 8(b) (1) (A) or as protected
under section 7. He concluded:
Because of the danger of conflict in the application of state law with the
National Labor Relations Board's application of the federal statute, the
trial court was without jurisdiction to issue an injunction. I am of the
opinion that for the same reason it was without jurisdiction to award
damages.37
As a final point, Justice Traynor pointed out that the majority was
overruling earlier decisions in treating picketing for a closed or
union shop as an improper objective of concerted labor activity, and
was in fact relying upon the labor policy of the state rather than
upon some more general common law tort principle.38
When the Garmon case again reached the United States Su-
preme Court, the way seemed cleared for an alfirmation on the basis
of varying state and federal relief, that is, compensatory damages for
past tortious conduct rather than preventive remedies which might
have been available from the Board.39 The Court, however, agreed
unanimously that on the facts of the case the California state courts
were without jurisdiction.
Writing for a majority of five,40 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who had
also written the Gonzales opinion, referred to the "Delphic nature"
of the statutory implications as to the states' powers over labor rela-
tions problems, which were "to be translated into concreteness by
the process of litigating elucidation," 41 and purported to find in the
past decisions of the Court "the consistently applied principles which
decide this case":
[The] unifying consideration of our decisions has been regard to the fact
that Congress has entrusted administration of the labor policy of the
37. Id. at 620, 320 P.2d at488.
38. Id. at 620-23, 320 P.2d at 488-90.
39. See 43 MnN. L. REV. 341 (1958), which concludes, on the basis of decisions
up to and including Gonzales and Russell, that this was the position of the Court.
40. Those concurring in the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter were Mr. Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan. Of these, the Chief Jus-
tice and Justices Black and Douglas had participated in the decisions in Garner,
Laburnum and Weber. Justices Black and Douglas had consistently voted for
federal pre-emption, while the Chief Justice had concurred in the majority opinion
in each case, as had Mr. Justice Frankfurter. In the Gonzales and Russell cases,
the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas had dissented in favor of pre-emption; Mr.
Justice Black had not participated; and Mr. Justice Brennan had voted with Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in the majority.
41. 359 U.S. at 241. The latter phrase is taken from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
opinion in .AM v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958).
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Nation to a centralized administrative agency, armed with its own pro-
cedures, and equipped with its specialized knowledge and cumulative
experience.42
He continued by pointing out that damages, as well as injunctions
or cease and desist orders, may provide an effective means of regula-
tion; that the primary concern of the Court in the past had been
focused upon the nature of the activities which the states could reg-
ulate rather than upon the method of regulation involved; and that
where the exercise of state power over a particular area of activity
threatened interference with a clearly indicated federal policy of
industrial relations, it was judicially necessary to preclude the states
from acting. Becoming more explicit, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated
that it had been clear that if the activities which the state purported
to regulate constituted protected activities under section 7 or unfair
labor practices under section 8, due regard for federal law required
that state jurisdiction must yield. He stated two excptions to this
pre-emptive doctrine: First, situations involving violence or immi.
nent threats to public order, which had traditionally been within
the police power of the states and "where the regulated conduct
touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility
that, in the absence of compelling Congressional direction, we could
not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to
act"; 43 and second, "where the activity regulated was a merely
peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act . . .
[citing Gonzales]."44 Where it was not clear whether the activity
over which the state purported to exercise jurisdiction came within
the provisions of sections 7 or 8, the courts were not the primary
tribunals to adjudicate the issue. Instead:
It is essential to the administration of the Act that these determinations
be left in the first instance to the National Labor Relations Board....
When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the
States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence
of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference
with national policy is to be averted.45
Turning to the facts of the case before him, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
found that the conduct could be either protected (peaceful con-
certed activity directed at education or organization of workers) or
prohibited (concerted activity directed at coercing or restraining
the employees in the exercise of their rights, or coercion of or an
42. 359 U.S. at 242.
43. Id. at 244. While only the quoted language is used, the cases cited. are those
included in note 19 supra in which the Court does refer to the traditional power
of the states to control violence, mass picketing, etc.
44. Id. at 243-44.
45. Id. at 244-45.
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attempt to coerce the employer to compel or induce the employees
to select the union as their representative), and that, therefore, in
the absence of a Board determination that neither was true, the state
could not grant any relief. The mere declination of the Board to
make such a determination, as in Guss or this case, did not give the
state the power to act.
Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Clark, Stewart and Whit-
taker, concurred in the result reached by the Court, on the ground
that the conduct of the union arguably was protected activity under
the federal law, but specifically rejected the conclusion of the major-
ity that if the conduct were not protected, the state would be fore-
closed from granting compensatory damages where the NLRB had
declined to assert its jurisdiction.46 While the majority explained the
results in Laburnum and Russell as state control of violence, the
concurring Justices interpreted the reference to violent conduct in
these opinions as indications only of the unprotected character of
the conduct, and stated that once such determination was made, the
only question would be that of possible inconsistency between the
federal prohibitions and state damage awards, a question which had
been resolved in the past in favor of consistency. 7 The emphasis in
the majority opinion upon the "primary jurisdiction" of the Board
was lessened in the concurring opinion, which would require refer-
ence to the Board only if there were a question of the protected
character of the activity, or if the activities could be treated as pro-
hibited and the state damage awards were inconsistent with federal
prohibitions. 4 The concurring Justices also argued that in this case,
as in Laburnum, there was no such inconsistency since the Board
would not be able to grant relief to the employer for past con-
duct. The concurring opinion summarized the undesirability of the
result which the majority would compel in the event that the con-
duct of the union were not protected, as follows:
The Court's opinion in this case cuts deeply into the ability of States
to furnish an effective remedy under their own laws for the redress of
past nonviolent tortious conduct which is not federally protected, but
which may be deemed to be, or is, federally prohibited. Henceforth the
States must withhold access to their courts until the National Labor Re-
lations Board has determined that such unprotected conduct is not an
unfair labor practice, a course which, because of unavoidable Board
delays, may render state redress ineffective. And in instances in which
the Board declines to exercise its jursidiction, the States are entirely de-
prived of power to afford any relief. Moreover, since the reparation
powers of the Board, as we observed in Russell, are narrowly circum-
46. 359 U.S. at 249.
47. Id. at 251-52.
48. Id. at 251.
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scribed, those injured by nonviolent conduct will often go remediless
even when the Board does accept jurisdiction. 49
Hence, there is a substantial conflict between the two opinions
in Garmon II. The majority asserted a rather extreme view of the
importance of centralized administration of the national labor pol-
icy and of the necessity for carrying that policy to the full extent
of congressional power. At the same time, what might be called
the "dissent" sought to accommodate both federal and state au-
thorities and placed primary emphasis on the protection of the
interests of employers, employees and the public- interests which
the federal act seeks to promote. Each group could find support for
its position in the precedents, which do not conclusively favor
either position. It is possible that the apparent inconsistencies in
precedents arise from the past uncertainties of the Court as a whole
as to what was the appropriate balance between the public and pri-
vate interests and between powers of the federal and state gov-
ernments. In this regard Mr. justice Frankfurter's position over the
years is of special significance, not only because of his long service
on the Court, covering the entire period during which the pre-
emption doctrine was developed, but also because he is the author
of the majority opinions in both Gonzales and Garmon II and be-
cause there is a discernible change in his approach to the problem
which may reflect the change in the Court's general approach.
In the initial "pre-emption" case, Hill v. Florida,1° Mr. Justice
Frankfurter dissented from the position that congressional pro-
tection of the employees' right to organize and choose representa-
tives for purposes of collective bargaining "impliedly wipe[d] out
the right of States under their police power to require qualifica-
tions appropriate for union officials having fiduciary duties." 51 He
argued that congressional enactments in the general domain of
commerce should supplant state regulation for the protection of
local interests only where there is a "direct and positive [conflict]
so that the two acts could not be reconciled or consistently stand
together."52 Where state legislation had been struck down, "there
was, in short, concreteness of conflict between what a State pre-
scribed and what Congress prescribed; the collision was demon-
strable, not argumentative." 53
In Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Relations Bd.,54 the
49. Id. at 253.
50. 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
51. Id. at 547.
52. Id. at 548, quoting from Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227, 243
(1859).
53. Id. at 554.
54. 380 U.S. 767 (1947).
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conflict of federal and state policies was obvious, since the state
board granted representation status to a foremen's union which
the NLRB had refused to do. In this case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
wrote a separate opinion in which he laid emphasis upon the desira-
bility of permitting the NLRB to determine that certain cases were
more appropriate for local or state regulation than national regu-
lation, and to enter into agreements with the state boards to exer-
cise jurisdiction over such cases. 5 In a portion of this opinion, he
foreshadowed the decision in Guss, by questioning the validity of
the majority's construction of the federal act to preclude concur-
rent state power where the Board deliberately decides that "mi-
dustrial relations having both national and state concern can most
effectively be promoted by an appropriate division of administra-
tive resources between the National and State Boards." 6 He was
"unable to see how the state authority can revive [merely] because
Congress has seen fit to put the Board on short rations," 57 thereby
causing the NLRB to decline to exercise its authority for budgetary
or other reasons. But the most significant language of the opinion
is the following:
When construing federal legislation that deals with matters that also lie
within the authority . . . of the State, we must be mindful that we are
part of the delicate process of adjusting the interacting areas of National
and State authority over commerce. The inevitable extension of federal
authority over economic enterprise has absorbed the authority that was
previously left to the states. But in legislating, Congress is not indulg-
ing in doctrinaire, hard-and-fast curtailment of the State powers re-
flecting special State interests. Federal legislation of this character must
be construed with due regard to accommodation between the assertions
of new federal authority and the functions of the individual States, as re-
flecting the historic and persistent concerns of our dual system of gov-
ernment. Since Congress can, if it chooses, entirely displace the States
to the full extent of the far-reaching Commerce Clause, Congress needs
no help from generous judicial implications to achieve the supersession
of State authority. To construe federal legislation so as not needlessly to
forbid pre-existing State authority is to respect our federal system. Any
indulgence in construction should be in favor of the States, because
Congress can speak with drastic clarity whenever it chooses to assure
full federal authority, completely displacing the States. . . . It may
make a decisive difference what view judges have of the place of the
States in our national life when they come to apply the governing principle
that for an Act of Congress completely to displace a State law "the repug-
55. Id. at 777 (separate opinion in which Justices Murphy and Rutledge joined).
Mr. Justice Frankfurter indicated that he would concur in the Court's decision if
it were limited to the proposition that the NLRB having determined that it was
undesirable as a matter of industrial relations to compel recognition of foremen's
unions, no state board can oppose this policy by a contrary policy applicable to an
enterprise subject to the federal act.
56. Id. at 778.
57. Id. at 779.
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nance or conflict should be direct and positive, so that the two acts could
not be reconciled or consistently stand together. ... 5s
What is before us is a very real and practical situation. The vast range
of jurisdiction which the National Labor Relations Act has conferred
upon the Board raises problems of administration wholly apart from
available funds. As a result of this Courts decision in National Labor
Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 [1939], untold small enter-
prises are subject to the power of the Board. While labor difficulties in
these units in the aggregate may unquestionably have serious reper-
cussions upon interstate commerce, in their individualized aspects they
are equally the concern of their respective localities. Accordingly, the
National Labor Relations Board, instead of viewing the attempt of State
agencies to enforce the principles of collective bargaining as an encroach-
ment upon national authority, regards the aid of the State agencies as
an effective means of accomplishing a common end. Of course, as Mr.
Justice Holmes said, "When Congress has taken the particular subject-
matter in hand, coincidence is as ineffective as opposition" to save the
State law. But surely this is so only when the State seeks "to enforce a
State policy differently conceived. . ... 59
Such statements seem to foreshadow Laburnum and Gonzales but
not Guss and Garmon. Two years later, when La Crosse Tel. Corp.
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. ° was before the Court,
involving at most a potential conflict of policy, Mr. justice Frank-
furter joined in the majority assertion of pre-emption, 61 perhaps
because in the interim the Taft-Hartley Act had been passed and
had provided machinery by which the NLRB could cede jurisdic-
tion over classes of cases where the state law was not inconsistent
with the corresponding provisions of the federal law.
But Mr. Justice Frankfurter had not completely abandoned his
earlier position favoring some State power over industries or dis-
putes which might affect commerce. This is apparent from his po-
sition two months later as author of the majority opinion in Al-
goma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd.,2 in which the Court upheld the power of the state to forbid
enforcement of a "maintenance of membership" clause unless the
contract containing it was approved by two-thirds of the employees
in a referendum conducted by the state board. Although the Wag-
ner Act had originally recognized the enforcement of "closed shop"
agreements with majority representatives as not constituting un-
58. Id. at 779-80.
59. Id. at 782-83.
60. 336 U.S. 18 (1949).
61. It is perhaps significant that Mr. Justice Rutledge who had joined in Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in the Bethlehem Steel Co. case indicated his position
in the following words: "Mr. Justice Rutledge, having joined in the dissent in
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Relations Board, . . . acquiesces in the
Court's opinion and judgment in this case." Id. at 27. (Emphasis added.)
62. 336 U.S. 801 (1949).
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fair labor practices on the part of employers, and the Taft-Hartley
Act had permitted unions and employers to enter into "union shop"
agreements,13 the majority treated these provisions as evidencing no
federal pre-emption of the question of union security provisions.
Although section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act did permit state
restrictions on union security, this would not wholly answer the
problem which dealt with a contract entered into prior to the date
of that provision and an order issued before such power was ex-
plicitly given to the state. At two points, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
refers to the conflict of state and federal laws:
[The words "inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this Act"
in Section 10(a)] must mean that cession of jurisdiction is to take place
only where State and federal laws have parallel provisions. Where the
State and federal laws do not overlap, no cession is necessary because
the State's jurisdiction is unimpaired. This reading is confirmed by the
purpose of the proviso in which the phrase is contained: to meet situa-
tions made possible by Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York S.L.R.B ...
where no State agency would be free to take jurisdiction of cases over
which the National Board had declined jurisdiction .... 13
Since the enumeration by the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act
of unfair labor practices over which the National Board has exclusive
jurisdiction does not prevent the States from enforcing their own poli-
cies in matters not governed by the federal law, such freedom of action
by a State cannot be lost because the National Board has once held an
election under the Wagner Act. The character of activities left to State
regulation is not changed by the fact of certification. Certification, it is
true, makes clear that the employer and the union are subject to federal
law, but that is not disputed. So far as the relationship of State and
national power is concerned, certification amounts to no more than an
assertion that as to this employer the State shall not impose a policy
inconsistent with national policy, Hill v. Florida. . . . or the National
Board's interpretation of that policy, Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York
S.L.R.B. ... La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin E.tB ..... 65
Whether the citation of the latter cases is an indication of accept-
ance of the majority opinions therein by Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
or only a recognition of the fact that the majority has stated the
federal law, is not clear.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's joining in the unanimous Garner de-
cision combined with his own opinion for the Court in Weber v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc.6 seemed to indicate his acceptance of the
necessity for uniformity of application of federal policy where the
Board does in fact exercise jurisdiction. And his participation in the
63. The Court discusses both acts, since although the contract had been entered
into and the worker discharged prior to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act,
the order of the Wisconsin board would have been enforceable after the Taft-Hart-
ley amendments to § 8(a)(3) became applicable.
64. 336 U.S. at 313.
65. Id. at 314-15.
66. 848 U.S. 468 (1955).
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Guss and Garnon I majorities indicate that by 1957 he had reached
the position of being willing to sublimate state interests even to
the extent of completely denying some remedies to the injured
parties. But his opinion in Gonzales and his position in Laburnum
and Russell suggested that there were some areas in which he be-
lieved state regulation differing in kind and in policy considerations
from that of the NLRB was permissible. However, his opinion in
Garmon II indicates that this is only true where the federal gov-
ermnent has taken no real interest in the type of conduct involved
in the state case.
How can one explain this shift in emphasis in Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's opinions and voting record, if indeed it was a conscious
change of position? One possible explanation could be that he be-
came alarmed by the great number of cases in which state courts
or labor boards intervened in situations where the conduct of the
parties (usually unions) was probably federally protected. While
most of the states seem to have accepted the Garner-Guss-Gar-
mon II doctrine of pre-emption without difficulty,67 there had
been questionable state assertions of jurisdiction in cases involv-
ing such conduct as secondary pressures against employers or cus-
tomers,"" minority picketing for recognition, 69 impositions of fines
for crossing picket lines,7 0 peaceful picketing to organize hotels
over which the NLB.B had not exercised jurisdiction, 1 or picket-
ing of an employer's salesroom to compel him to reopen a plant
closed ostensibly for economic reasons.71 In other doubtful deci-
67. See, e.g., Devine Bros. v. Teamsters Union, Local 191, 154 A.2d 193 (Conn.
C.P. 1959); Savva v. Royal Industrial Union, Local 937, 20 Conn. Supp. 488, 138
A.2d 799 (Super. Ct. 1958); Industrial Workers Local 286 v. Star Prods. Co., 16 MI1.
App. 2d 321, 148 N.E.2d 43 (1958); Hyde Park Dairies, Inc. v. Teamsters Union,
Local 795, 182 Kan. 440, 321 P.2d 564 (1958); Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Teamsters
Union, Local 795, 181 Kan. 775, 317 P.2d 349 (1957); Swope v. Emerson Elec.
Mfg. Co., 303 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1957); Market Bowling Alleys v. Browne, 44 L.R.R.M.
2815 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959); Corer House Restaurant, Inc. v. Wepprecht, 42
L.R.R.M. 2167 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958); Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Napoli,
395 Pa. 801, 150 A.2d 546 (1958); McJunkin Corp. v. Bell Lines, Inc., 108 S.E.2d
12 (W. Va. 1959).
68. Sebastopol Co-op. Cannery v. General Truck Drivers Local 980, 37 L.R.R.M.
2069 (Calif. Super. Ct. 1955); Arnold Bakers, Inc. v. Strauss, 207 Misc. 752, 153
N.Y.S.2d 999 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Willoughby Camera Stores, Inc. v. Dist. 15, Ma-
chinists Union, 205 Misc. 455, 129 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Teamsters Union,
Local 941 v. Whitfield Transp., Inc., 154 Texas 91, 273 S.W.2d 857 (1954).
69. J. J. Newberry Co. v. Retail Clerks, Local 560, 78 Idaho 85, 298 P.2d 375
(1956), rev'd, 352 U.S. 987 (1957); Forshay Bros., Inc. v. Goldstein, 36 L.R.R.M.
2052 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. April 15, 1955); Cavett v. Machinists Dist. Lodge 34, 103 Ohio
App. 45, 136 N.E.2d 276 (1956); Richman Bros. Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing
Workers, 144 N.E.2d 561 (Ohio C.P. 1956), modified, 144 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1957) (eliminating injunction of peaceful picketing).
70. Carey and Lodge 78, IAM, 44 L.R.R.M. 1060 (Wis. Emp. Eel. Bd. 1959).
71. Hotel Employees, Local 255 v. Sax Enterprises, Inc., 93 So.2d 591 (Fla.
1957), rev'd, 358 U.S. 270 (1959).
72. Freydberg, Inc. v. ILGWU, 128 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 19, 1954).
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sions, state courts had concluded: that the federal act was inap-
plicable because of the absence of an "employer" or "employee"
within the meaning of those terms as used in the act; 73 that agree-
ments between unions and nonlabor groups which had the effect
of restraining trade were not within the purview of the federal
labor act; 74 that claims which would be barred by the Taft-Hart-
ley Act's six-month statute of limitations are subject to state court
jurisdiction; 75 or that any conduct which might constitute a com-
mon law tort is subject to state regulation. 8 At the same time, state
courts had asserted jurisdiction in many other instances in which
conflict with the federal law was more doubtful, such as cases grant-
ing remedies for loss of employment due to union opposition to
individual workers,77 cases enjoining picketing for a closed shop,7 8
and in suits to compel carriers to deliver to a company involved in
a dispute with a union,79 and to compel bargaining with a rival
union when the employer already has a collective argreement with
one union. 0 Even in these later cases, however, there existed the
potentiality for conflict upon which the ultimate position taken by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter may be explainable. It is also possible that
the devious route by which the Court seems to have moved from
Hill v. Florida and Garner to Garmon II is indicative of the fact
that under the tremendous pressures and demands of the Court's
73. New York, N.H. & H. R.R. v. Jenkins, 331, Mass. 720, 122 N.E.2d 759
(1954), rev'd 350 U.S. 155 (1956); Oliver v. All-States Freight, Inc., 156 N.E.2d
190 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957), rev'd, 358 U.S. 283 (1959); County of Door v. Plumbers
Union, Local 298, 4 Wis.2d 142, 89 N.W.2d 920 (1958), rev'd, 359 U.S. 354
(1959).
74. Lewis, Inc. v. Warehousemen, Local 542, 163 Cal. App. 2d 771, 330 P.2d 53
(1958); Oliver v. All-States Freight, Inc., 156 N.E.2d 190 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957),
rev'd, 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
75. Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Fernandez, 16 Misc. 2d 265, 184 N.Y.S.2d 810
(Sup. Ct. 1959), modified, 44 L.R.R.M. 2195 (App. Div. 1959) (denying jurisdiction
to enjoin after Garmon 11).
76. Benjamin v. Foidl, 379 Pa. 540, 109 A.2d 300 (1954), which relies on the
alleged recognition in Laburnum of the states' right to deal with common-law torts,
disregarding the fact that the remedy in that case was damages rather than in-
junctive relief.
77. Sound Technicians v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 141 Cal. App.
2d 23, 296 P.2d 395 (1956); Perko v. Local 207, Bridge Workers, 151 N.E.2d 742
(Ohio 1958); Pierce v. Otis Elevator Co., 333 P.2d 480 (Okla. 1958); MacDonald
v. Feldman, 393 Pa. 274, 142 A.2d 1 (1958); Selles v. Local 174, Teamsters Union,
50 Wash. 2d 660, 314 P.2d 456 (1957).
78. Alabama Highway Express, Inc. v. Local 612, Teamsters Union, 268 Ala.
392, 108 So. 2d 350 (1959); Machinists Union, Local 924 v. Goff-McNair Motor
Co., 223 Ark. 30, 264 S.W.2d 48 (1954); Farnsworth Chambers Co. v. Local 429,
IBEW, 201 Tenn. 329, 299 S.W.2d 8 (1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 969 (1957).
79. Aladdin Industries, Inc. v. Associated Transp., Inc., 323 S.W.2d 222 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1958); Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc. v. Cook Truck Lines, Inc., 296 S.W.2d
379 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 968 (1957).
80. J. Radley Metzger Co. v. Fay, 4 App. Div. 2d 436, 166 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1957);
Planet Wood Corp. v. Marine Workers, 13 Misc. 2d 787 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958).
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own caseload, a thorough and consistent analysis of the problems
of federal-state relations could be developed only after a series of
arguments, briefs, and conferences among the various justices en-
compassing fourteen years.
In assessing the wisdom of the Supreme Court's narrow restric-
tion of state power and its insistence upon implementation of a fed-
eral labor policy by the NLRB in situations in which the Board has
determined that there is no substantial impact on commerce, al-
though technically the unfair practice "affects commerce," the ques-
tion arises of the necessity for uniform protection of collective
bargaining as an institution. The conclusion that Congress intended
uniform federal policy to reach to the furthest extent of its power
over business probably is supported in the legislative history of the
NLRA and the LMRA.81 Certainly the qualifications of section
10(a), permitting cession of jurisdiction to states having laws not
inconsistent with the federal act, do not necessarily pull in the other
direction, 2 and the failure of Congress to act from 1954 to late in
81. Although the primary objective of the language of § 10(a) of the Wagner
Act to the effect that the Board's power to remedy unfair labor practices should
be "exclusive" seems to have been to avoid conflict with other federal agencies
or "boards" created by industry itself, it was important to Congress that the Board
be the "paramount administrative or quasi-judicial authority in connection with the
development of the Federal American law regarding collective bargaining." S. REP.
No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1935). See also H.R. REPn. No. 1147, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 23 (1935); H.R. REP,. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1935). The elim-
ination of this language in the Taft-Hartley Act seems to have been motivated
somewhat by the introduction of provisions for temporary injunctions and damage
suits for secondary boycotts. H.R. REi. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1947).
At the same time, Congress was willing to permit the Board to divide its juris-
diction with the state agencies, if they both applied consistent law, S. REi. No. 105,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1947); H.R. REP'. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 52
(1947), and to allow states to impose more rigid restrictions on union security
provisions than the federal law did, see LMRA (Taft-Hartley) § 14(b), 61 Stat.
151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1952). It seems likely, however, that within the
area of businesses affecting commerce, Congress intended the federal law to be
applicable, with these two rather narrow exceptions. But see 93 CONG. REc. 6383
(1957), in which Representative Hartley assured his colleagues that the validity of
state laws on labor is protected.
82. The original provision in S. 1126 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), as reported
to the Senate, read:
That the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any State or
Territory to concede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry
[with certain exceptions] . . . even though such cases may involve labor dis-
putes affecting commerce provided the state agency conforms to national policy,
as herein defined, in the determination of such disputes.
The language was included in H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), as passed
by the Senate. However, in the conference report, the section is explained as per-
mitting cession, "if the applicable provisions of the State or Territorial statute and
the rules of decision thereunder are consistent with the corresponding provision of
the National Act, as interpreted and applied by the Board and the courts." H.R.
REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1947). The modification in language seems
to have been designed to spell out more clearly what constituted conformity to na-
tional policy.
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1959 to remedy the situation created by the Court's interpretation
of the acts lends credence to the interpretation.
But as the "dissenting" Justices in Garmon II have pointed out, the
effect of pre-emption in such a case is to deprive the participants in
labor-management relations of any protection other than self-help,
to leave the employer free to discriminate or interfere with his em-
ployees' concerted activities and the union free to make use of
coercive tactics which may be opposed to federal policy.s3 While in
some cases self-help may be effective, it seems clear that one of the
primary objectives of the federal labor acts is to provide means for
avoiding the economic disruption incident to lockouts, wholesale
discharges, or strikes and picketing which cause the shut down of a
business."4 Moreover, the variations in the economic power of the
participants in differing situations are just as likely to cause non-
uniformity of result as the application of state laws or policies. This
is not to say that the state courts should be free to enjoin or punish
conduct which on its face appears to be protected by the federal
act. While the primary authority to determine the scope of such
protection may have been given to the Board, in the situation where
the Board will not undertake to make such a determination on the
merits, there seems to be no substantial reason for denying to the
courts the power to look to past determinations of the Board and the
legislative history of the act itself in deciding whether the particular
conduct is "protected." The dangers of disruption of labor relations
resulting from the use of injunctive relief could have been reduced
by limiting the state courts to the granting of damages. As others
have pointed out, the effect of a judgment for damages is not imme-
diate and may be mitigated on review.85 While it is true that the
threat of punitive damages may provide a deterrent to engaging in
conduct which may be protected under the act, the primary ob-
jective of protection of the participants in the labor dispute might
be equally as well accomplished by limiting the states further to
the granting of compensatory damages. However, no such attempt
to coordinate federal policy and potential state regulation of labor
83. It has been suggested by some courts that to deny any relief to the injured
party would in fact be a denial of due process. See Johnson v. Grand Rapids Bldg.
Trades Council, 40 L.R.R.M. 2616 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1957). Another court has sug-
gested it is at least so contrary to justice as not to justify pre-emption. Willard v.
Huffman, 44 L.R.R.M. 2425 (N.C. 1959).
84. See § 1 of the Wagner Act and Taft-Hartley Act for the explicit statement of
this policy:
The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal
by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to
strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest....
85. See Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over La-
bor Relations: I, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 6, 32, 39 (1959); Wellington, Labor and the
Federal System, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 542, 553 (1959).
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relations, in the absence of effective federal enforcement, seems to
have been undertaken by the Supreme Court. Instead, after a series
of seemingly inconsistent statements of the doctrine of federal pre-
emption, the Court has reached the conclusion that state courts and
agencies must be precluded from offering any remedy for conduct
disapproved by federal policy. While it is possible that the Court's
decision on the facts of Garmon II can be justified on the basis that
the federally protected conduct should not be regulated by state
damage actions, the author believes that the Court was unwise in
denying to the states the power to control or remedy prohibited
conduct over which the Federal Board has declined to exercise any
regulatory power.
There still remains, however, the possibility that there is some
conduct on the part of unions or employers which is not clearly
protected nor prohibited by the federal act. In an early case, Inter-
national Union, UAW-AFL v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.
(Briggs-Stratton),s6 the Court found "quickie" work stoppages to be
within the range of state regulation because of lack of federal regu-
lation. Similarly, in Algoma Plywood & Veneer v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Bd.,s7 the majority of the Court treated the reg-
ulation of union security provisions as within the power of the
states. But in Garner, the unanimous Court said:
The detailed prescription of a procedure for restraint of specified types
of picketing would seem to imply that other picketing is to be free of other
methods and sources of restraint. For the policy of the national Labor Man-
agement Relations Act is not to condone all picketing but only that ascer-
tained by its prescribed processes to fall within its prohibition. Otherwise,
it is implicit in the Act that the public interest is served by freedom of
labor to use the weapon of picketing. For a state to impinge on the area
of labor combat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of
federal policy as if the state were to declare picketing free for purposes or
by methods which the federal Act prohibits s
While such language might be interpreted as sounding a death
knell for the doctrine of Briggs-Stratton, it is noteworthy that in
Weber, the Court's opinion written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter re-
fers with approval to the holding in that case. 9 Professor Meltzer
in his exhaustive study of the Court, Congress and the problem of
state regulation suggests that some of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
language repudiates the Garner view that there are but two types of
conduct, federally prohibited and federally protectedf 0 Meltzer
does point out, however, that Weber does in some measure impose
86. 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
87. 336 U.S. 301 (1949).
88. 346 U.S. at 499-500. (Emphasis added.)
89. 348 U.S. 468, 477 (1955).
90. Meltzer, supra note 85, at 18.
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a restriction on Briggs-Stratton, since it limits state action to con-
duct "which is clearly not protected and clearly not prohibited."9
The problem of the demise of Briggs-Stratton is raised again in
the opinions in Garmon II. Although some of the language used by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggests that the doctrine of Briggs-Stratton
is not completely dead,9 2 the emphasis upon the primary jurisdic-
tion of the Board in determining the scope of the federal act seems
to require that the states forego the exercise of any jurisdiction un-
less the conduct is beyond doubt a "mere peripheral concern of the
Labor Management Relations Act," or involves violence or threats
to public order.93 Moreover, doubt is shed on the vitality of Briggs-
Stratton by the statement: "Or, the Board may decide that an ac-
tivity is neither protected nor prohibited, and thereby raise the
question whether such activity may be regulated by the States." 94
To this, the following footnote is appended: "See Auto Workers
v. Wisconsin Board, 866 U.S. 245 [Briggs-Stratton]. The approach
taken in that case, in which the Court undertook for itself to de-
termine the status of the disputed activity, has not been followed in
later decisions, and is no longer of general application." 95
The comment of the concurring Justices is worth noting for their
interpretation of this language:
I . . . can find no basis on principle or in past decisions for the Court's
intimation that the States may even be powerless to act when the under-
lying activities are clearly "neither protected nor prohibited" by the federal
Act. Surely that suggestion is foreclosed by Automobile Workers v. Wis-
consin Board,5 . . . as well as by the approach taken to federal pre-
emption in such cases as Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board, supra; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Re-
lations Board .... and Algoma Plywood and Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board, . . . not to mention Laburnum and Rus-
sell and the primary jurisdiction doctrine itself.6 Should what the Court
now intimates ever come to pass, then indeed state power to redress
wrongful acts in the labor field will be reduced to the vanishing point.96
To this the following notes are appended at the appropriate points:
5. The Court may be correct in stating that "the approach taken in that
91. Ibid.
92. "When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a
State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act, or consti-
tute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment re-
r es that state jurisdiction must yield." 859 U.S. at 244. "At times it has not been
ear whether the particular activity regulated by the States was governed by § 7
or § 8 or was, perhaps, outside both these sections." Ibid. "In the absence of the
Board's clear determination that an activity is neither protected nor prohibited or
of compelling precedent applied to essentially undisputed facts, it is not for this
Court to decide whether such activities are subject to state jurisdiction." Id. at 241.
93. Id. at 243.
94. Id. at 245.
95. Id. at 245 n.4.
96. Id. at 253-54.
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case, in which the Court undertook for itself to determine the status of the
disputed activity, has not been followed in later decisions, and is no longer
of general application." That, however, has nothing to do with the vitality
of the holding that there is no pre-emption when the conduct charged is in
fact neither protected nor prohibited. To the contrary, that holding has
remained fully intact, and, as already noted, underlay the decisions in
Laburnum and RusselI t7
6. If the "neither protected nor prohibited" category were one of pre-
emption, there would be no point in referring any injunction case ini-
tially to the Board since the pre-emption issue would be plain however
the challenged activities might be classified federally. The same is true
of damage cases under the Court's premise of conflict. State power would
thus be confined to activities which were violent or of merely peripheral
federal concern, see International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales. .... 98
Had the language quoted from the majority opinion stood with-
out comment, it would have been logical to conclude that the
Court intended only to negate the possibility that Briggs-Stratton
would be relied upon by the state courts to take into their own
hands the determination of what is "neither protected nor prohib-
ited." However, the emphatic rejection of any further implication by
what is essentially a dissenting opinion leads one to speculate that
Mr. Justice Frankfurter and his concurring colleagues may have
been attempting to by-pass all aspects of Briggs-Stratton. Such spec-
ulation, in turn, leads to a consideration of whether it is appropriate
to leave this "loophole" in what otherwise appears to be a dike
against state regulation.
In view of the extent to which Congress has examined the var-
ious aspects of labor-management relations and internal union affairs
and undertaken to regulate some aspects thereof, it may be argued
that conduct which has not been prohibited by the act is in fact con-
sidered by Congress to be permissible and appropriate conduct.
This is negated, however, by federal decisions indicating the exist-
ence of conduct which is treated as "unprotected" although it does
not fall within any of the prohibitions of the act including false
or "disloyal" statements on picket signs unrelated to labor dis-
putes,99 strikes to compel violation of federal laws,100 strikes in vi-
olation of other federal laws,' 0 ' strikes in breach of contract, 02 sit-
down strikes,103 and wildcat strikes. 0 4 Congress was cognizant of
several of these decisions when it passed the Taft-Hartley Act, and
specifically stated that the protection of sections 7 and 13 is not
97. Id. at 253 n.5.
98. Id. at 254 n.6.
99. NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
100. American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944).
101. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
102. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
103. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Co., 806 U.S. 240 (1989).
104. NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944).
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intended to cover such conduct as strikes in violation of contract,
sitdown strikes, or strikes which constitute mutiny.105
It is significant that the conduct which the Court treated as in
the penumbral area of unprotected-unprohibited conduct in Briggs-
Stratton, a partial shutdown or partial strike, has since been categor-
ized by the Board in two cases as a violation of the act,1 6 a refusal
to bargain in good faith. However, it is probably even more signifi-
cant that the courts have set aside such orders as the Board has is-
sued on the basis of this categorization. 0 7 Similarly, a strike which
the Board found to be in violation of a contractual commitment to
settle disputes by a grievance-arbitration procedure was treated by
the Board as a violation of the act, 08 but the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit set aside the cease and desist order
on the ground that while a breach of contract might be "unpro-
tected" activity, it was not an unfair labor practice. 0 9 Finally, the
only conduct which the Garmon II majority seems to clearly recog-
nize as unprotected and unprohibited, exemplified in Gonzales, has
come under the eye of the federal government and may now be of
something more than mere peripheral concern, although the pro-
visions of the LMRDA make it clear that any state remedies which
previously were available to the union member wrongfully disci-
plined are to remain available." 0
Does the mere existence of a category of conduct which is neither
protected nor prohibited by the federal act argue for state regula-
tion? Here we must balance the interest of the state in giving pro-
tection to its citizens from conduct which is injurious, against the
danger that in defining the area in which it may operate, the state
will in fact encroach upon the "protected" or "prohibited" areas.
For example, in McLean Distrib. Co. v. Local 998, Brewery Drivers
Union,"' former drivers for a brewery company had been hired
by a distributor taking over the distribution of the brewery com-
panys products. They struck to compel the distributor to bar-
gain as to working conditions, although he already had a collective
105. S. RoP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1947) (summary by Senator Taft
of the conference bill).
106. Insurance Agents Union (Prudential Ins. Co.), 119 N.L.R.B. 768 (1957).
Textile Workers Union (Personal Products Corp.), 108 N.L.R.B. 743 (1954).
107. Insurance Agents Union v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert.
granted, 358 U.S. 940 (1959); Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 409
(D.C. Cir. 1954), grant of cert. vacated, 352 U.S. 864 (1956).
108. Local 2935, UMW (Boone County Coal Co.), 117 N.L.R.B. 1095 (1957);
Local 9735, UMW (Westmoreland Coal Co.), 117 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1957).
109. Local 2935, UMW v. NLRB, 257 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (setting aside
the Boone County Coal Co. case). The Court of Appeals also reversed the West-
moreland Coal Co. case, Local 9735, UMW v. NLRB, 258 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir.
1958), but on the basis that there was no strike to modify the contract.
110. LMRDA §§ 103, 603(a), 604.
111. 94 N.W.2d 514 (Minn. 1959), 44 Mnn-r. L. REv. 327 (1959).
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bargaining agreement with the union which was not subject to re-
opening and renegotiation during its term. The state court found
tat the strike was in breach of the contract, and therefore not
"protected" activity,1 2 but went on to hold that it was also not a
violation of section 8(d) forbidding strikes during the term of a
contract designed to obtain modification or termination thereof."3
However, in this author's opinion, the latter construction is erron-
eous, and the possibility of conflict of federal and state policy is
apparent. The Wisconsin board's determination that a union could
not properly impose a fine upon its members for crossing a picket-
line," 4 also appears to involve the possibility of conflict with the fed-
eral policy protecting concerted activity in support of labor's claims.
And a New York determination that union pressure to compel an
employer to reopen a plant is outside the bounds of the federal act " 5
may run counter to a federal policy either to encourage a broad
scope of collective bargaining or to limit the areas about which
either side can compel the other to bargain." 6 In such instances, the
possibility of review and eventual "correction" by the Supreme
Court of erroneous interpretations of the federal law may be inade-
quate: first, because the delay incident to review makes any in-
junctive relief which is immediately granted effective even though
the injunction is eventually dissolved; second, because the Supreme
Court may be unwilling, as in Garner, Weber and Garmon, to define
with any precision the bounds of the federal act, deferring instead
to the NLRB's "primary jurisdiction"; third, because the reviewing
court may be unable or unwilling to undertake a de novo determin-
ation of the facts found by the trial court, and the protection or
prohibition of the conduct may well be decided by such a fact-
finding process.
The price which may have to be paid for preservation of the
federal policy protecting certain conduct is the chance that other
conduct which is neither protected nor prohibited may go unregu-
lated by any governmental agency, where it does not involve vio-
lence or other threat to the public peace and order. It can even be
argued that Congress, in having undertaken to prohibit only cer-
tain types of conduct and at the same time recognizing that there
are other "non-protected" types of conduct," 7 intended that such
112. Citing NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939) and W. L. Mead,
Inc., 113 N.L.R.B. 1040 (1955).
113. This was done by construing the Supreme Court's opinion in NLRB v. Lion
Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282 (1957), as limiting § 8(d) to situations where there was a
contract subject to reopening.
114. Carey and Lodge 78, IAM, 44 L.R.B.M. 1060 (Wisc. Emp. Rel. Bd. 1959).
115. Freydberg, Inc. v. ILGWU, 128 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954).
116. Cf. NLRB v. Borg-Warner, Wooster Div., 356 U.S. 342 (1958), discussed
in Note, 43 MnqN. L. REv. 1225 (1959).
117. See note 105 supra.
1959]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
nonviolent, unprotected conduct should be regulated by the pro-
visions which the parties themselves might make for grievance or
arbitration settlements, or that the parties should be left to their
own powers of self-help, such as strike or discharge, to obtain re-
medies for this conduct.1 .8 The denial of state remedies other than
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements would seem to
effectuate this policy decision.119
Perhaps the final resolution as to the distribution of power be-
tween federal and state authorities is most appropriately one for the
legislative branch of the federal government. The problem involves
a balancing of the interest of the nation in promoting collective bar-
gaining and protecting neutrals and participants from the excesses
of either party to collective bargaining against the interest of the
states in regulation of matters which have their most immediate
impact upon the locality and in assuring protection of the economic
well-being of employers and employees in small business concerns.
But the legislative inaction following Garner and Guss might have
justified a somewhat broader policy-making function of the Court
in Garmon II. This is particularly true in the light of Laburnum
Russell and Gonzales, as well as the opinion in Garmon I, all of
which seemed to offer some limited protection under state law
against abuses of employers and unions.
II. Tim LEcISLATiVE SOLUTION AND SOME QUEsTIONS UNRESOLVED
A. Section 701 of The Labor Management Reporting & Disclosure
Act of 1959 and Its Antecedents
It is probably unfair to place sole responsibility for the creation
of the no man's land on the judicial branch of the federal govern-
ment, since Congress had undertaken to regulate labor-management
relations in very broad language and had increasingly encroached
upon various aspects of those relations, while the NLRB had volun-
tarily withdrawn its exercise of jurisdiction. Yet, it can be said that
the Guss and Garmon II decisions did nothing to alleviate the situ-
ation. The solution, if it was to come at all, seemed to rest in the
118. It should be noted that the 1947 Senate bill, proposing to make violation
of a collective bargaining agreement by an employer or a labor organization an un-
fair labor practice, was not intended to do away with the parties' own means of
compelling compliance through grievance and arbitration procedures; and it was
not intended that the Board should provide a forum for the settlement of all dis-
putes concerning alleged breaches of contract or to entertain damage actions for
breach of contract. S. Rsa'. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1947). The ultimate
elimination of this provision seems to have been motivated by a desire to leave the
parties to the usual processes of law, that is, damage actions, under § 301. H.R.
Rns,. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42 (1947).
119. The enactment of § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act and the language of the




hands of Congress, either (1) by giving the Board additional per-
sonnel and funds to engage in full scale regulation of all businesses
affecting commerce or (2) by defining more precisely the divid-
ing line between exclusive federal regulation and permissible state
regulation.
As a matter of historical fact, several attempts had been made
in the past to restore to the states jurisdiction over those cases of
labor-management relations which the NLRB was unwilling to
handle. The first of these was the addition of a proviso in section
10(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act permitting the NLRB to cede juris-
diction over certain cases to the states.120 This came ten days follow-
ing the Supreme Court's opinion in Bethlehem Steel Co.,' which
had thrown considerable doubt upon the validity of an agreement
between the NLRB and the New York State Labor Relations Board
under which the state board conducted representation proceedings
over certain classes of cases. The failure of the NLRB to execute any
cession agreements under section 10(a) seems to have arisen from
the statutory requirement that the state law not be inconsistent with
federal law, which was interpreted by the NLRB as requiring almost
complete coincidence of federal and state statutory provisions. 22
Whether this was the intention of Congress in passing section 10(a)
is not clear, since the original Senate report merely referred to per-
mitting state labor relations boards to have jurisdiction, 2 3 while the
minority report says only, "this proposal is made necessary by the
decision of the Supreme Court in Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York
Labor Relations Bd." 24 During debates on the act, Representative
Hartley stated: "This bill once again protects the validity of State
laws on labor .... That is my interpretation of the bill, that this
will not interfere with the State of Wisconsin in the administration
of its own laws."' 25 On the basis of this legislative history, one
might argue that Congress intended to permit the Board to cede
jurisdiction to states whose labor laws were not in direct conflict
120. Provided, That the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency
of any State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in
any industry (other than mining, manufacturing, communications, and trans-
portation except where predominantly local in character) even though such
cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, unless the provision of
the State or Territorial statute applicable to the determination of such cases by
such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this Act or has
received a construction inconsistent therewith.
LMRA (Taft-Hartley Act) § 10(a), 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a)
(1952).
121. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
The case was decided on April 7, 1947, and the proviso reported to the Senate on
April 17, 1947, although not enacted into law until June of that year.
122. See 13 NLRB ANN. REP. 18 (1948).
123. S. Bin,. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1947).
124. S. Bin. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1947) (minority views).
125. 93 CONG. REc. 6383 (1947).
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with the federal law rather than limiting cession to situations where
there was complete identity. However, the following year, the
"watchdog committee," reviewing the activity under the new act,
noted with apparent approval the Board's interpretation. 26
From 1953 up to the recent session of Congress there have been
several bills introduced which would have permitted the states to
assert jurisdiction over "local" businesses even though they might
conceivably "affect commerce" in the constitutional sense.12 None
of these attempts proved successful, however, and in fact only one
of the bills ever reached the floor of either house from committee.
In contrast to these attempts to undo the doctrine of pre-emption,
Senators Kennedy, Ives, Morse, and Hill, in 1958, introduced a bill
which in part sought to correct the no man's land by requiring the
NLRB to assert all of the potential jurisdiction which it possessed
under the act.' 8 While this received the approval of the Senate,1 29
it did not pass the House for reasons which probably did not relate
to this particular provision of the bill. 30
In June, 1958, Mr. Boyd Leedom, Chairman of the NLRB, ap-
peared before a congressional committee and suggested that the
Board would adopt new and more liberal jurisdictional standards if
it could obtain an increased budget.'3' The 1958-59 appropriation
126. S. REPa. No. 986, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1948):
Generally speaking, the statutes in these states [New York, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin with whom the Board had considered cession agree-
ments] were modeled after the Wagner Act. Corresponding sections of their
statutes and the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 have about the
same degree of inconsistency as is found between the latter act and the Wag-
ner Act. Some State statutes for example have not defined union unfair labor
practices, nor have they limited the right to enter into compulsory union mem-
bership contracts. It therefore appears that ceding of jurisdiction in unfair
labor practice cases will not be possible unless and until a State enacts a
statute modeled after the [Taft-Hartley] Act. . . .No State laws presently
contain the limitations of compliance by filing financial and other information
and the making of anti-Communist affidavits, but the agreement might provide
that a State agency would not process a case in an industry over which juris-
diction had been ceded unless the union had met those requirements.
127. See H.R. 9678, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); S. 1772, 1723, H.R. 6482, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); S. 2650, Sd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); S. 2218, 1785, 1161,
83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). None of these except S. 2650 got out of committee,
and that bill was recommitted to the Senate Committee on Labor and Welfare. See
100 CONG. REc. 6203 (1954).
128. S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
129. 104 CONG. REc. 11487 (1958).
130. The bill was referred to committee, 104 CONG. rec. 15342 (1958), but
failed to pass the House after suspension of the rules, 104 CoNG. REc. 18288 (1958).
Although in the course of House debate the provision requiring the Board to exer-
cise all of its jurisdiction was criticized, 104 CONG. REc. 18269, 18271, 18274 (1958),
this was only one of many objections raised, and in spite of the passage of the
Landrum-Griffin Bill by the House this year, the author is in doubt as to whether
these objections were the most persuasive.
131. See 42 LAB. REL. RPro. 185 (1958).
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for the NLRB was thereupon increased in the amount of $1,500,000
for the purpose of permitting the extension of jurisdiction.'32 In the
fall, the Board put its new standards into effect,133 thereby expand-
ing its jurisdiction over about twenty per cent of the no man's land
and covering all but twenty-five per cent of the employees within
the potential jurisdiction of the Board, 34 although this may still
leave some fifty per cent of manufacturing firms and over seventy-
five per cent of retail and service establishments outside the juris-
diction of the Board. 35 Chairman Leedom also had recommended
that the Taft-Hartley Act be amended to permit the states to take
jurisdiction of cases over which the Board had declined to exercise
its potential jurisdiction.3 6 In announcement of the new standards,
the Board said:
We are taking this action as a consequence of the situation to which the
Supreme Court referred in the case of Gus& v. Utah Labor Relations
Board. Therein the Supreme Court adverted to "a vast no-man's land,
subject to regulation by no agency or court," and declared: (1) "Con-
gress is free to change the situation;" and (2) "The National Labor Re-
lations Board can greatly reduce the area of no-man's land by asserting
its jurisdiction."'L37
And, in its initial decision, while recognizing that the extension
of jurisdiction would not wipe out the no man's land, the majority of
the Board concluded:
[It] will bring within its exercised jurisdiction a significant number of the
enterprises previously falling outside that area and the expected case-load
resulting from these standards represents the maximum workload that
can be expeditiously and effectively handled by the Board and its staff
within existing budgetary policies .... 13
3
132. See 23 NLRB ANN. EP. 8 (1959).
133. Siemons Mailing Serv., 122 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 43 L.R.R.M. 1056 (Nov. 14,
1958).
134. See Hearings on S. 505, and Other Bills Pertaining to Labor Management
Reform, Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 606-07 (1959) (statement of Chairman Lee-
dom of the NLRB).
135. Joseph Di Fede, Chairman of the New York Labor Relations Board, has
reported a 1958 estimate of the Small Business Administration that the NLRB's
pre-1958 jurisdictional limits covered less than three per cent of the retail industry,
less than one per cent of the public utilities and services, and less than ffty per
cent of manufacturers. Di Fede, Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor
Management Disputes, 4 N.Y.L.F. 398, 402 (1958). The figures in text represent
eighty per cent of those areas not covered. The Small Business Administration
estimates that under the present standards some 3 million out of 4 million small
businesses in the United States were in the no man's land. SanL Busn'xss An-
inw.sT-RAT oN TWELFTH SamkNsN. REP. FoR Six Mos. EismmG JuNE 30, 1959 at 2.
136. 42 LaB. REL. REP. 185 (1958).
137. NLRB Press Release R-570 July 22, 1958; 23 NLRB AsuN. REP. 7 (1959).
138. Siemons Mailing Serv., 122 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 43 L.R.R.M. 1056, 1057
(Nov. 14, 1958).
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The Board added that in the exercise of its authority it had de-
clined "to assert its full statutory jurisdiction . . . in the belief that
such a policy will best effectuate the policies of the act." 139
When the Kennedy-Ervin bill was brought to the Senate in 1959,
it contained a provision for the repeal of the "cession" provision to
section 10(a) of the NLRA and for the addition of a new section
14(c) as follows:
The National Labor Relations Board shall assert jurisdiction over all labor
disputes arising under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended:
.Provided, That the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency
of any State or Territory to cede to.such agency jurisdiction over any
cases in any industry (other than mining, manufacturing, communica-
tions, and transportation except where predominantly local in character)
even though such cases or kinds of cases may involve labor disputes af-
fecting commerce, unless the provision of the State or Territorial statute
applicable to the determination of such cases or kinds of cases by such
agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this Act or has
received a construction inconsistent therewith. 40
On the other hand, the Administration bill would have added
section 6(b) (1), specifically allowing the Board to decline juris-
diction when in its opinion the effect of a labor dispute upon com-
merce was not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of itsjurisdiction, and would have added section 6(b) (2):
Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or the
courts of any State . . . from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over
labor disputes over which the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1)
of this subsection, to assert jurisdiction. 141
The McClellan bill also contained specific provision for the Board's
declination of jurisdiction, but would have required that the Board
clearly define its jurisdictional limits in regulations, and would
have authorized the states to act where the Board would not assert
jurisdiction or could not act because of the failure of the union
to comply with the filing requirements of the act.'
What emerged from the Senate Committee on Labor and the de-
bates on the floor of the Senate was something of a compromise
between these extreme positions. Section 14 of the LMRA was to be
amended by added subsections (c) (1), (c) (2) and (c) (8) which
139. Ibid.
140. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 601(a) (1959); 105 CoNG. REc. 825-26(daily ed. Jan. 20, 1959). (The provision was introduced by Senators Kennedy, Er-
vin, Hill, Church, Williams of N.J., Randolph, Murray, Morse, McNamara, Clark,
Sparkman and Humphrey.)
141. S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 502 (1959); 105 CONG. REc. 1160 (daily ed.
Jan. 28, 1959). (The provision was introduced by Senators Goldwater, Dirksen et
al.).
142. S. 1137, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); 105 CONG. REc. 2407 (daily ed. Feb.
19, 1959).
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would have permitted state agencies other than courts to assert jur-
isdiction in cases over which the NLRB declined jurisdiction, but
would have required the state agency to apply and be governed
solely by federal law as set forth in sections 8 and 9 of the LMRA
and the rules of decision of the NLRB and federal courts. There was
also to be provision for temporary injunctive relief under section
10(j) (1) and enforcement or review of state agency orders in the
federal district courts within the state, comparable to the enforce-
ment and review of NLRB orders in the courts of appeals. 143 This
provision retained the primacy of the federal law as applied to all
cases of labor disputes affecting interstate commerce. At the same
time, it permitted the burden of handling representation proceed-
ings and unfair labor practice charges to be shifted from the
NLRB to state agencies acting as "little NLRB's." But the most
serious problem connected with the proposal was that only twelve
jurisdictions have agencies which are comparable in any way to the
NLRB in dealing with labor-management relations, and in two of
these, Kansas and Minnesota, the agency is neither empowered, nor
necessarily equipped, to deal with unfair labor practices.-44
148. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 601 (1959); 105 CoNG. [tac. 5942 (daily
ed. April 24, 1959) (as proposed by Senators Cooper, Morse and Javits). 105 CoNG.
REc. 6048 (daily ed. April 25, 1959) (as passed by the Senate). This differs from
the recommendations of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, S.
REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1959), which would have compelled the
NLRB to exercise all jurisdiction within its power but permitted it to cede juris-
diction over "cases which are primarily local" to state agencies which would act
as agents of the NLRB and would be subject to federal substantive law with re-
view and enforcement of the state agency's orders by the NLRB through the courts
of appeals. It also differs from the amendment of Senator Prouty of Vermont, 105
CONG. REc. 5949 (daily ed. April 24, 1959), which would have permitted the
Board to decline jurisdiction but would have required it to publish its limitations
of jurisdiction and to decide whether a particular labor dispute or case was within
its jurisdiction, on the petition of any person interested in the dispute, and fur-
ther would have permitted state courts to deal with unfair labor practices and
state agencies to deal with labor disputes, unfair labor practices and representation
cases, provided the state court or agency was bound by federal law.
144. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-5--i to 80--5-22 (1953); CoNN. Gzr. STAT.§§ 31-101 to 111 (1958); H~wAn REv. LAWS ch. 90 (1955); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 44--801 to -815 (1949) (Supp. 1957); MASs. GEN. LAws ch. 150A (1957);
MrnN. STAT. § 179.01-.17 (1957); N.Y. LAB. LA-w §§ 700-16 (1937); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, §§ 211.1-.9 (1952); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 29, §§ 61-76 (1955); R.I.
Girx. LAws ANN. tit. 28, ch. 7 (1956); UTA. CoDE ANN. tit. 34, ch. 1 (1953);
UTAn CODE ANN. 34-1-2 (Supp. 1959); Wisc. STAT. §§ 111.01-.19 (1957). Michigan's
labor disputes act, Mici. Comp. LAws § 423 (1948), deals with settlement of dis-
putes by mediation and arbitration, and undertakes some restrictions on picketing
and requires strike notices and authorization. But it fails to provide any unfair la-
bor practice provisions, and places enforcement of the restrictions on strikes and
picketing in the hands of the board of mediation or any person, labor organiza-
tion, corporation or firm, by any proper equitable or legal remedy in any court
of competent jurisdiction. Kansas and Minnesota have labor conciliators, but the
enforcement of the unfair labor practices in each of these states is in the hands
of others; in Kansas -the attorney general, county attorney, or any aggrieved
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When the Senate bill reached the House, it underwent substantial
changes. Not the least of these was the treatment of the no man's
land problem. The Committee on Education and Labor voted out a
bill which took the name of its chairman, Representative Elliott, and
which would have (1) required the NLRB to assert jurisdiction over
all labor disputes under the NLRA, (2) increased the membership
of the Board from five to seven members, and (3) authorized the
Board to delegate certain powers to its regional directors and to the
General Counsel. 45 Representatives Landrum and Griffin proposed
a substitute bill which would (1) permit the NLRB to decline
jurisdiction in cases in which, in its opinion, the impact upon com-
merce was not substantial and (2) authorize the states to assert
jurisdiction in such cases. 46 Representative Sheeley introduced still
a second substitute which would have required that the Board ex-
ercise jurisdiction over all labor disputes arising under the act.r4 7
In the debates on the House floor, it was clear that all three pro-
ponents agreed that the present situation was an intolerable one and
should be remedied. The supporters of the Elliott and Shelley bills
argued: that uniformity in national labor policy was desirable and
that to permit the states to exercise any jurisdiction over matters
which were covered by the national act would destroy this uniform-
ity of application; that the large majority of states lacked the
agencies to administer elections or representation proceedings or
to parallel the NLRB's function of protecting against unfair labor
practices; and that to give the states the power to apply their own
laws would involve a return to the "justice by injunction," criminal
conspiracy, and the common-law principle of prima facie tort which
had been the basis of severe criticism in the past and was not de-
sirable today. 4 ' On the other hand, the supporters of the Landrum-
person; in Minnesota- any aggrieved person who may seek an injunction in a court
of competent jurisdiction. While the jurisdiction of the labor relations board in
the other states named above encompasses enforcement of the unfair labor practice
provisions, in Colorado, Hawaii, and Wisconsin, this power is specifically not ex-
clusive and does not prevent the granting of any legal or equitable relief to a person
injured by an unfair labor practice. Several of the states provide for some reporting
of financial affairs. See, for example, Mn-N. STAT. § 179.21 (1957), requiring finan-
cial reports to members. However, New York is the only state which seems to have
enacted any provisions as comprehensive as the federal reporting and disclosure and
"improper practices" legislation. N.Y. LAB. LAw §§ 720-32 (Supp. 1959).
145. H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701 (1959) (as reported to the House);
105 CONG. RPEc. 12860 (daily ed. July 23, 1959), 18563 (daily ed. July 30, 1959),
14175 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1959).
146. H.R. 8401, 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 701 (1959); 105 CONG. REc.
13877 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1959), 14182 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1959), 14369, 14377,
14389 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1959), 14485, 14486, 14509 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1959).
147. H.R. 8490, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); 105 CoNG. REc. 13719 (daily ed.
Aug. 3, 1959).
148. See, e.g., the statements of Representatives Udall (on behalf of the Elliott
bill) and Shelley, 105 CoNG. REc. 14181-82, 14192 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1959), as
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Griffi bill argued that in the existing no man's land the problem
of labor relations was primarily a local one and that the national
policy should be subservient to giving the employer and his em-
ployees some protection rather than leaving them to the mercies of
economic warfare; that even with an expanded personnel, the Board
could not provide speedy relief and would be likely to be so
swamped by the rush of cases arising from the no man's land that
any effective enforcement of the national policy would be endan-
gered. 149 There seems to have been no substantial support for the
"compromise" of the Senate bill, perhaps because the number of
states which could or would be able to take over the administration
of federal law in the "ocal" problem area was limited to twelve, and
it would be unlikely that the states themselves would relish financing
a 'little NLRB" which did not enforce state law and was not sub-
ject to review by state courts.150 The bill which passed the House
was the Landrum-Griffin bill, which in conference was modified to
prohibit the Board from declining to exercise jurisdiction over labor
disputes over which it would have asserted jurisdiction under its
most recent standards. As signed into law, the provisions read:
Section 701. Section 14 of the National Labor Relations Act . . . is
amended by adding . . . the following new subsection:
"(c) (1) The Board, in its discretion may, by rule of decision or by pub-
lished rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, decline
to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or cate-
gory of employers, where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such
labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the
exercise of its jurisdiction: Provided, That the Board shall not decline to
assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would assert juris-
diction under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.
"(2) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency
or the courts of any State or Territory . . . from assuming and asserting
jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board declines . . . to
assert jurisdiction." :51
B. Some Unresolved Questions
(1) The Board's Definition of Jurisdiction
One problem which the current legislation may raise is whether
well as the analysis of the Landrum-Grifin Labor Reform Bill by Representatives
Thompson of New Jersey and Udall. 105 CoNG. R.c. 14202 (daily ed. Aug. 11,
1959).
149. See the statements of Representatives Landrum, 105 CONG. REc. 14182 (daily
ed. Aug. 11, 1959), Hiestand, 105 CoNG. REc. 14206 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1959),
and Dixon, 105 CoNG. REe. 14209 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1959).
150. S. REPl. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1959), indicates that the Senate
committee intended to recommend the use of federal funds to reimburse any state
agency which entered into an agreement to act as the "agent" of the NLB. No
similar provision appeared in the bill as it passed the Senate.
151. LMRDA § 701(a).
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the NLRB's 1958 definition of its jurisdictional standards is sufficient
to comply with the provisions for declination under LMRA section
14(c) (1). At the time those standards were announced, it was not
clear that Board declination would be the process by which state
courts or agencies might obtain jurisdiction. It would seem, how-
ever, that if the Board has declined because, "in the opinion of the
Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not suffi-
ciently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction," this
should be sufficient, even though it occurred prior to the date of
the act. Certainly the reference in the final provision to the jurisdic-
tion which the Board exercised on August 1, 1959, implies that
Congress believed that the Board's then existing standards were in
compliance with the language of the act. As to the language used
by the Board in announcing its "rule of decision""5 2 in Sienons
Mailing Serv.,0 3 it might be argued that the declination was based
on budgetary and personnel limitations more than on a determina-
tion that there was no substantial impact on commerce. At one point
the majority said: "[T]he expected caseload resulting from these
standards represents the maximum workload that can be expedi-
tiously and effectively handled by the Board and its staff within
existing budgetary policies and limitations." 54 However, the opinion
152. The 1959 legislation gives the Board the alternative of declining jurisdiction
either "by rule of decision or by published rules pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act." So far, the Board's announcements of its jurisdictional standards have
been done in the former manner. The 1958 revision was originally proposed in a
press release on July 22, 1958, with an invitation to all interested persons to submit
briefs or comments. The release stated that after consideration of these comments
and passage of any pending legislation, "the final standards Will be set forth in
decisions rendered by the Board following September 1, 1958." While this would
seem to constitute notice" and an opportunity to participate in the rule-making
process, both of which are required by the ALPA § 4, the notice and the standards
were not published in the Federal Register as have been other "rules" made by
the Board (see, e.g., 23 Fed. Reg. 3254 (1958)) pursuant to its "rule-making
power" under § 6 of the NLRA, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act: "The Board
shall have authority from time to time to make, amend and rescind in the manner
prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act." LMRA § 6, 61 Stat. 140 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 156 (1952).
One might ask whether "rule of decision" differs from "decision," and whether
the language used was intended to distinguish between the sort of broad rules
announced in 1958 covering classes of cases and a decision which determined only
that on the specific facts of the case before the Board, exercise of its jurisdiction
would be inappropriate. I have found nothing in the legislative history, except the
use of "any class or category of employees" in § 14(c)(1) of the LMRA, to confirm
this suspicion. Of course, there is always the possibility that an attempt by the
Board to exclude an entire industry, as it did in the case of hotels and labor unions,
would be held to be an abuse of its discretion. See Hotel Employees, Local 255 v.
Leedom, 858 U.S. 99 (1958); Office Employes, Int'l Union, Local 11 v. NLRB, 353
U.S. 313 (1957). The Board did, however, extend its exercise of jurisdiction to both
hotels and labor unions before August 1, 1959.
153. 122 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 43 L.R.R.M. 1056 (Nov. 14, 1958).
154. 122 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 43 L.R.R.M. 1056, 1057 (Nov. 14, 1958).
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went on to point out that any broadening of jurisdiction would
probably result in a serious lengthening of the time for processing
cases and a resulting loss of efficacy of the Board as a forum for
the resolution of disputes, and that with these circumstances in
mind, the Board declined to assert its full stautory jurisdiction "in
the belief that such a policy will best effectuate the policies of the
Act." "" This latter language reflects that of the pre-1950 cases in
which the Board declined to exercise jurisdiction because of a lack
of substantial impact on commerce, 156 and language used by the
Board in explaining its prior definitions of jurisdiction which refer
to impact on commerce. 157 It seems relatively clear, therefore, that
a state court or agency may, after November 13, 1959 (the effective
date of this portion of the act), assert jurisdiction over employers
who fall below the 1958 minimal requirements.
But is this decision as to whether the facts of a particular dispute
fall within the area of NLRB jurisdiction or within the competence
of a state tribunal to be determined by the state court? It might be
noted, as Senator Morse did in his arguments opposing the com-
promise of the conference report, 58 that while the Board may lay
down some monetary standards for its jurisdictional limits, in the
past it has generally applied those standards on the basis of facts
as to business as they appeared at the time of the hearing, looking
back at the prior calendar year or the prior twelve-month period,
rather than looking to the facts as they appeared when the conduct
or question before it arose. 59 It seemed possible that the state
court might do the same, making the assumption that if at the time
a case is presented to it the Board would not have asserted juris-
diction under its then existing standards, the court is empowered
to do so. However, the NLRB has announced that in the future it
will issue "advisory opinions" concerning the application of its jur-
isdictional standards on petition of parties, state courts, or state
agencies who may be in doubt as to whether a particular proceeding
would be subject to Board jurisdiction.160 This probably will result
155. Ibid.
156. See, e.g., Herff Motor Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 1007, 1008 (1947); Southwest Metals,
72 N.L.R.B. 54 (1947); Airline Bus Co., 64 N.L.R.B. 620, 621 (1945); Consolidated
Vultee Aircraft Corp., 57 N.L.R.B. 1680, 1681 (1944).
157. See, e.g., Breeding Transfer Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 493-94 (1954); Hollow Tree
Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 635, 636 (1950).
158. See 105 CONG. REc. 16391 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959).
159. Langlade Veneer Prods. Corp., 118 N.L.R.B. 985 (1957); Local 840, Aroo-
stook Fed'n of Farmers, Inc., 114 N.L.R.B. 538 (1955). Where the employer's
current business was diminished by a strike, the Board has asserted jurisdiction on
the basis of an estimate of business absent the strike. Hygienic Sanitation Co., 118
N.L.R.B. 1080 (1957).
160. NLRIB Rules and Regs., Series 8, Subpart H, 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.98-.104, 24
Fed. Reg. 9115 (Nov. 7, 1959). The Board regulations refer to an "advisory opinion
as contrasted with the "declaratory order" which the General Counsel may obtain
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in a requirement that private parties, state courts, or agencies obtain
a Board ruling in the event that there is any dispute. Certainly the
language of the Garmon II opinion indicates that in all questionable
cases the Board itself must make the decision.16 It should be further
noted, however, that this does not mean that the Board is under-
taking to make an ad hoc decision as to jurisdiction in each case but
only that it will determine whether the facts of the case fall within
its current standards.
(2) Application of Federal Law in the No Man's Land
One of the major problems which would appear to arise under
the language of the amendment concerns the extent to which the
federal law is now applicable in the area of the former no man's land.
The LMRA still purports to state the rights of employees in indus-
tries affecting commerce, to define unfair labor practices which
affect commerce, and to provide machinery for the selection of a
representative for collective bargaining where a question of repre-
sentation affecting commerce exists. It is true that the prevention
of such unfair labor practices and the operation of the machinery
to select a representative are placed in the hands of the NLRB, and
that the Board is permitted to decline jurisdiction where "the effect
of such labor dispute [presumably either an unfair practice or a ques-
tion concerning representation] on commerce is not sufficiently sub-
stantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction." However, the
courts and the Board have previously indicated that the regulation
of labor relations by Congress may go beyond the Board's exercise
of jurisdiction,0 2 and there is no specific provision in the 1959 act
that in the areas where the Board declines to exercise jurisdiction
the federal law is inapplicable. Rather the language is that the pro-
visions of the act shall not "be deemed to prevent or bar any agency
or courts of any state . . . from assuming and asserting jurisdiction
over labor disputes over which the Board declines . . . to assert
jurisdiction." The question of the possible extent of the federal law
may arise in two contexts: (a) where the state court or agency
asserts jurisdiction and is faced with a request by one party to apply
federal law to the facts before it; and (b) where the NLRB extends
where both unfair labor practice charges and a petition for representation are on
file with relation to the same employer at the same time. Rules and Regs., Subpart
H, 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.105-.110, 24 Fed. Reg. 9115 (Nov. 7, 1959). A "declaratory
order" is binding upon the Board, but an "advisory opinion" is binding neither upon
the Board nor presumably upon the state courts or parties. See 1 DAvIs, A mnNsRA-
TrvE LAW TREATIS §§ 4.09-.10 (1958).
161. 359 U.S. at 244-46, discussed in text accompanying note 45 supra.
162. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Carmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Cuss
v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Siemons Mailing Serv., 122 N.L.R.B.
No. 13, 43 L.R.R.M. 1056 (Nov. 14, 1958).
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its jurisdiction beyond the present limits and is asked to consider
conduct occurring prior to such extension.
Where a state court is faced with a dispute between an employer
and his employees or a labor union, it may be called upon to apply
federal law even though the LMRDA says that it, rather than the
NLRB, may assert jurisdiction on the facts of the dispute. The fail-
ure of earlier legislative attempts to turn over jurisdiction in the no
man's land to the states,'63 and the view of the Senate that federal
law should be applicable throughout the potential scope of con-
gressional regulatory power, whether administered by federal or by
state agencies, 6 4 might weigh in favor of a continued application of
federal law, even though the state court or agency is now permitted
to assert jurisdiction. However, the elimination, originally by the
House and ultimately by the entire Congress, of a provision re-
quiring state courts or agencies to apply federal law, 65 together
with the statements of Senator Kennedy in explanation of the con-
ference report, 66 indicate that Congress was willing to have state
courts apply state law and leave the application of federal law to
those cases in which the federal agency, NLRB, asserts its juris-
diction over a business or its labor disputes. In the majority of states,
there is the possibility that something like federal rights might be
enforced. Most states have no comprehensive labor relations statutes.
In such states, the courts could appropriately modify the common
law to give protection to those rights which the federal government
has in the past protected in order to encourage collective bargain-
ing. 67 Whether the courts of these states will go so far, in the ab-
sence of any directives from their legislatures, is not clear. It seems
doubtful, however, that they would be likely to treat the federal
act as applicable to any business which may affect commerce where
the effect of a labor dispute is not sufficient to induce the NLRB to
exercise jurisdiction.
In those states, such as Minnesota, where the legislature has al-
ready undertaken to define the rights of employees to engage in
168. See note 127 supra and accompanying text.
164. See notes 128, 129, 148 supra and accompanying text.
165. See notes 145-51 supra and accompanying text.
166. It was the opinion of the Senate that the federal law should prevail with
respect to interstate commerce and, in order to compromise that feature, it was
agreed that state law could prevail only in those areas in which the NLRB does
not assume jurisdiction. 105 CoNG. REc. 16255 (daily ed. Sept. 2, 1959).
167. A persuasive argument is presented for such modification in Blumrosen,
Common Law Limitations on Employer Anti-Union Conduct: Protection of Employee
Interest in Union Activity by Tort Law, 54 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1959). The apparent
reversal of position of the California court in the Garmon case to permit the em-
ployer to obtain protection against union activity directed at recognition or organiza-
tion of his employees is an example of this sort of modification of state law. See
Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1958),
discussed in text accompanying notes 33-38 supra.
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self-organization and concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining, and has defined unfair labor practices of employers
and labor organizations, the state courts presumably would be bound
to follow the state statutes and to ignore the federal acts. Even
though there is no direct conflict between federal and state regula-
tions in such states, the application of federal law would be inap-
propriate, since it might tend to disturb the balance which the state
legislature has struck between the competing interests of labor,
management, and the public-just as the Supreme Court of the
United States in Garner decided that the concurrent application of
federal and state law would be inappropriate where the NLRB did
exercise jurisdiction.
In state court proceedings or in proceedings before state agencies,
then, federal law as such is unlikely to be applicable except as its
principles are adopted by the state as its own law. But if the NLRB
should undertake to extend its jurisdiction to encompass labor dis-
putes which under the present standards are subject to state law, a
more difficult question will arise as to whether federal law may be
applied to conduct occuring prior to such extension of jurisdiction.
Certainly Congress, in compelling the Board to exercise jurisdic-
tion over all labor disputes over which it would have exercised jur-
isdiction on August 1, 1959, contemplated that the Board might
broaden its jurisdiction beyond these limits. While the Board's pres-
ent position seems to be that such an extension of jurisdiction must
await a future lessening of the caseload burden, this is not an in-
surmountable obstacle. If and when administrative reorganization
or expansion makes it feasible to increase the number of cases or
businesses over which the Board might exercise jurisdiction, the
Board may choose to extend the coverage of the federal act's effec-
tiveness rather than simply reducing the time which it devotes to
the present scope of jurisdiction. It may then be faced with the
following types of problem involving possible retroactive application
of federal law.
Suppose that Union A and Company B enter into a collective bar-
gaining agreement at a time when Company B's business could be
said to "affect commerce" in the constitutional sense but when it
would fall below the jurisdiction asserted by the Board. Suppose
further that the agreement contains a closed shop provision which
is legal under the law of the state, 6' and that Worker C, who is not
168. This is apparently so, either through statute or decision, in California, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Idaho, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin, although there may
have to be two-thirds majority favoring such agreement in some of these states.
McKay v. Retail Automobile Salesmen's Local Union, 16 Cal. 2d 311, 106 P.2d 373
(1940); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 80--5-7 (1953); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 31-105
(1958); Robison v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 782, 35 Idaho 418, 207 Pac.
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a union member, is discharged under this provision. Subsequently,
but within six months of the execution of the agreement and the
discharge of C, the NLRB announces new jurisdictional standards
in conformity with the LMRDA. Company B's business is such as to
bring it within these new limits. If C now files charges with the
Board, may it find that the conduct of Union A and Company B
constituted unfair labor practices under sections 8 (b) (2) and 8 (a)
(8) and require that C be reinstated with back pay from the date of
discharge? Since Company B was always technically engaged in a
business affecting commerce, the provisions of the federal act may
have been applicable all the time. On the other hand, the state law
permitted a closed shop, and both Union A and Company B presum-
ably relied upon this law in entering into the contract at a time when
the Board refused to deal with their conduct. Here the federal law
is more stringent in its restrictions on labor and management in the
interests of protecting the right of workers to refrain from joining
a union or engaging in concerted activity.16 9
Or suppose that Union D seeks to obtain recognition from Com-
pany E, making a claim supported by union authorization cards that
it represents a majority of workers in E's plant. At the time of the
demand, E's business is below the minimum jurisdictional standards
announced by the NLRB, although E does receive some goods from
out of state and ships a portion of its products to other states. The
state law does not provide for representation elections or proceed-
ings, and so Union D, in an effort to enforce its claim, sets a picket
line around E's place of business. E discharges all of the known
members of Union D and, when the picketing is continued, E seeks
an injunction against "stranger picketing." The state court, following
the older common law precedents in the state, issues a permanent
ijunction against picketing by non-employees. Shortly thereafter,
the NLRB announces new jurisdictional standards which would now
encompass the business of E. Can Union D now charge Company E
vith unfair labor practices or discriminatory discharge (section 8
182 (1922); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150A, §§ 4(3), 6A, 6B, 6C (1957); MIcH.
ComP. LAws § 423.14 (1948); MnN. STAT. § 179.12(8) (1957); Caldwell v.
Anderson, 357 Mo. 1199, 212 S.W.2d 784 (1948); F. E. East Co. v. United Oyster-
men's Union, 130 N.J. Eq. 292, 21 A.2d 799 (1941); N.Y. L.A. LAw § 704(5)
(1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.6(1)(c) (1953); R.I. GEN. Lws ANN. ch. 7,
§ 28-7-13 (1956); and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.06(1) (1957).
169. NLRA § 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended by LMRA (Taft-Hartley Act) §
157, 61 Stat. 1140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (8). (Emphasis added.)
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(a)(3)) or refusal to bargain (section 8(a)(5))? May the NLRB
order that Company E is under an obligation to bargain with Union
D as the representative of its employees until the effects of the prior
unfair practices have been dissipated, and a Board-conducted elec-
tion can be held to determine whether Union D is presently the
representative of a majority of the workers? 17 0 Here also there is a
federally protected right, if the federal law is applicable despite the
declination of jurisdiction by the Board.
Under the Taft-Hartley Act, at least, the Board's jurisdictional
standards did not represent the full scope of the federal act, as
evidenced by Guss, Garmon I1 and the Board's own application of
the provisions of the federal act to conduct occuring at a time when
it had not asserted jurisdiction over a particular industry or segment
thereof. 7 1 The "dissenting views" expressed in the House report,
favoring state jurisdiction in the no man's land, stated:
Prior [to Guss] the National Labor Relations Board handled cases which
substantially affect commerce. The States covered those refused by the
Board. Employers, unions and employees knew which law applied. It
was a system which worked satisfactorily for all concerned. The need
today is to re-establish clear lines of authority between the Federal Gov-
ernment and the States.' 72
The conference report or House Managers' statement of the com-
promise of the House and Senate conferees is not explicit on this
point. But Senator Kennedy in presenting the conference agreement
to the Senate said:
It was the opinion of the Senate that the Federal law should prevail with
respect to interstate commerce, and, in order to compromise that feature,
it was agreed that State law could prevail, but only in those areas in which
the National Labor Relations Board does not now assume jurisdiction.'7 3
On the following day, in response to an inquiry from Senator Car-
170. Cf. Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U. S. 702 (1944). The Court upheld the
determination of the NLRB that loss of a majority due to unfair labor practices of
the employer did not justify denying the union the right to bargain on behalf of
the workers.
171. In NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952), the court
refused to enforce a Board order of reinstatement of a worker discharged under a
closed shop agreement not in accord with the NLRA, on the ground that at the
time of the contract and the discharge the Board had declined to exercise jurisdiction
over the employer or the construction industry. However, as Professor Davis has
pointed out, this case is not supported either by preceding or subsequent decisions.
2 DAvis, ADmm'IsaTxrE LAw TREATIsE § 17.07 at 530 (1958). See also Optical
Workers' Union v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Gottfried Baking
Co., 210 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Kobritz, 193 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1951);
Siemons Mailing Service, 122 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 43 L.R.R.M. 1056 (Nov. 14, 1958);
cf. Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. Employees v. NLRB, 238 F.2d 38 (D.C.
Cir. 1956); NLRB v. Pierce Bros., 206 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1953).
172. H. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 97 (1959).
173. 105 CONG. REc. 16255 (daily ed. Sept. 2, 1959).
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roll as to whether there might not still be a substantial area in which
some persons who were entitled to the protection of the federal act
would not be able to obtain protection, Senator Kennedy responded:
[W]e provided that the States could assume jurisdiction in that area....
But we point out that when we provide that the States can assume juris-
diction in this area, we must bear in mind that 35 of the States have no
adequate labor laws. In that connection, I assure the Senator from Colo-
rado that I shall watch very carefully what actions are taken by these
various states, because if any effort is made to use this provision as an
opportunity to limit rights which all of us believe all American working
people and employers in these States have, then it will be very easy under
this provision for the National Labor Relations Board by administrative
decision to assume much fuller jurisdiction.' 7 4
The latter statement might be open to the interpretation that if
the Board does reassert federal jurisdiction in the no man's land, the
federal remedy will be available to give protection to rights which
have always existed. But it may mean only that in the event of fla-
grant abuse of their newly reacquired power, the states may be
ousted of jurisdiction over future conduct by the Board's extension
of its jurisdiction.175
To read the act as leaving to the discretion of the NLRB the
vital question of whether its provisions are applicable to a labor
dispute, as contrasted with whether they will in fact be enforced,
might seem an undue delegation of authority, 7 6 though probably
174. 105 CONG. REc. 16417 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959).
175. It is probable that this would have to occur in several states, since the Board
has in the past applied its jurisdictional limits to all states and territories, and any
extension of jurisdiction is most unlikely to be on anything but a nationwide basis.
The act does not specifically deny the Board the power to frame its jurisdiction on
the basis of state boundaries or regional boundaries, but in using "classes or cate-
gories of employers," it seems probable that the intent of Congress was that the
Board should not apply differing monetary standards in differing states. Whether
such a variation in jurisdiction would violate the due process requirements of the
Constitution also seems questionable. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment does not apply to the federal government.
See Hess v. Mullaney, 213 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1954); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
89 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1937), affirmed 301 U.S. 548 (1937). But the due process
clause of the fifth amendment may achieve the same result. See Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954); United States v. Eramdjian, 155 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
States have been permitted to make distinctions between industries in labor legisla-
tion. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917) (distinguishing
vorkmen's compensation liability on basis of risk); New York Central R.R. v. White,
243 U.S. 188 (1917) (exclusion of farm employees and domestic servants from
workmen's compensation); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (limiting hours
of labor in mines and smelters). Nevertheless, it might be argued that granting
protection of the federal law to employees and employers in one state while refusing
to grant it in another, would constitute a form of discrimination repugnant to the
constitutional requirements of equality before the law.
176. This point was made explicitly by Representatives Thompson and Udall in
their analysis of the Landrum-Griffin Bill, 105 CONG. REc. 14206 (daily ed. Aug. 11,
1959), and at least by implication by Senator Morse in his comments on the con-
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not an unconstitutional one..7 But the uncertainty and conflict in-
herent in having both federal and state law apply without certainty
of recourse to the federal agency may justify this interpretation as
the wiser choice, or the Board may avoid the question by clearly
stating that in extending jurisdiction it will not treat as unfair labor
practices conduct of a person occuring at a time when the Board had
declined jurisdiction over the class or category of employers into
which the business falls. At one time the Board did take such a posi-
tion with respect to its modifications of jurisdictional standards, 178
but recent decisions seem to have gone in the direction of ab initio
application of the act's provisions, under the theory that the Guss
case made it clear (prior to the 1959 legislation) that the LMRA
applied to small employers even though the Board did not assert its
jurisdiction."9 It is not clear whether the Board will continue this
latter practice when the federal law now provides that the states
may exercise jurisdiction so long as the Board does not. But to per-
mit retroactive assertion of federal law over a situation which
appeared to be governed by state law may be contrary to our con-
cepts of fairness. 8 ° The author believes such ab initio or retroactive
application is unwise.
(2) Possible Extension of Federal Jurisdiction
A second major question which may arise from the 1959 legislation
is whether, and to what extent, the Board should undertake to ex-
pand its present exercise of jurisdiction. The recognition by Con-
gress of a discretionary power on the part of the Board to decline
ference report. 105 CONG. REc. 16391-92 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959).
177. This was the downfall of an earlier attempt at federal regulation of economic
affairs. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). It may be argued, however, that there
are "intelligible standards" for the exercise of the delegated authority, in the require-
ment that jurisdiction be declined on the basis of no "substantial impact on (inter-
state) commerce," and the implicit approval of the existing monetary standards
which would avoid this constitutional argument. See Bowles v. Willingham, 321
U.S. 503 (1944); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
178. See Almeida Bus Lines Inc., 99 N.L.R.B. 498 (1952); Tom Thumb Stores,
Inc., 95 N.L.R.B. 57 (1951); Screw Mach. Prods. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1609 (1951).
179. [T]he Board does not believe that the mere fact that a respondent had
reason to believe by virtue of the Board's announced jurisdictional policies that
the Board would not assert jurisdiction over it, gave it any legal, moral or
equitable right to violate the provisions of the Act. This is especially true since
the issuance of the Guss decision which eliminated all possible basis for believ-
ing that in such circumstances the provisions of the Act did not apply, or that
State law could or would apply to its conduct.
Siemons Mailing Serv., 122 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 43 L.R.R.M. 1056, 1058 (Nov. 14,
1958). The Board declined to follow the Atldnson decision cited in note 171 supra.
Ibid.
180. For a discussion of retroactive application of law and administrative regula-
tion, see 1 DAvis, ADMmaISTRAT=v LAW TrATisE § 5.08 (1958); 2 DAvis, ADMN-
IsTA=-W LAW TREASE § 17.07 (1958).
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jurisdiction indicates that the extent of federal regulation of labor-
management relations may appropriately be restricted to less than
coverage of any and every business which "affects commerce,"
a term which carries us to the very furthest extent of permissible
congressional regulatory power. If one farmer growing wheat for
his own use is within the scope of potential regulation, 8" if a win-
dow washer engaged in cleaning the windows of an office building
of an interstate concern can constitutionally be subject to congres-
sional regulation, 8 2 or if the impact of labor disputes upon many
small businesses may be cumulated to produce an "effect on com-
merce," 8 3 then almost all retail and service or manufacturing busi-
nesses are within the potential scope of the LMRA, since almost all
businesses make use of or acquire goods or services from interstate
commerce, or provide goods or services to those engaged in inter-
state commerce, or compete with those who are clearly within the
federally regulated area. On the other hand, there is reason to be-
lieve that Congress did not intend that the Board's 1958 jurisdic-
tional standards should represent the fullest extent of federal regu-
lation. 8 4 The statements by the Board in announcing its most recent
limitations evidenced some possibility that at a future date, with an
expanded budget and increased personnel, further extensions might
be undertaken.8 5 While such extensions may not occur tomorrow
or perhaps for the next five years, there is reason to believe that
pressure for federal regulation may ensue in the event that the ma-
jority of states continue to apply older common law principles or
to give substantially less protection than the federal act does to
participants in industrial relations or to the public generally.
The Board's power to limit its jurisdiction is phrased in terms of
a decision by the Board that the effect upon interstate commerce
of a labor dispute involving a given class or category of employers
"is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its juris-
181. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), enforcing the AAA on the
basis of effect of supplanting grain which might be grown by others.
182. See Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173 (1946),
enforcing the Fair Labor Standards Act prior to the 1949 amendments which defined
"produced" to eliminate such localized activities.
183. See, e.g., Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLBB, 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944) (dictum);
NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607-08 (1939) (dictum); Mid-Co. Gasoline Co.,
86 N.L.R.B. 448 (1949), enforced, 183 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1950).
184. The Senate had originally advocated application of federal law over all
business affecting interstate commerce. See text accompanying note 144 supra. Since
the House took the position that the states should be permitted to apply their own
law when the NLRB declined to assert jurisdiction, a compromise was reached only
on condition that the Board could not decline to exercise jurisdiction over all
businesses subject to its potential jurisdiction at the time the act was passed. See
text accompanying note 173 supra.




diction." 186 This raises the question of whether the Board may look
to anything other than the impact upon interstate commerce in
considering the propriety of further expansion of its jurisdiction. In
the past the Board has phrased its restrictions of jurisdiction in
terms of lack of "a pronounced impact upon the flow of interstate
commerce." 187 Similarly, the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over
individual plants in a multi-state enterprise or a multi-employer
association, if the entire enterprise met the jurisdictional stand-
ards, 188 and its assertion of jurisdiction over secondary boycott
charges on the basis of the combined interstate business of the
primary and secondary employers, 18 9 have been based on impact
upon commerce.
The variations in jurisdictional limits asserted from 1950 to 1959,
however, suggest that something other than impact upon the flow
of goods across state lines has been considered by the Board in de-
termining the extent of its jurisdiction. It is possible, of course, that
succeeding Board members have disagreed with prior decisions
concerning what constitutes a "pronounced impact' upon com-
merce and as to how far a labor dispute in a marginal area may
obstruct the free flow of goods and services. It is also possible that
the increase in jurisdictional amounts from 1950 to 1954 merely
reflects inflationary trends and the belief on the part of the 1954
Board that the type of manufacturer who in 1950 would have
fallen below the requirements of $25,000 direct outflow or $50,000
indirect outflow of goods or services from the state, could in 1954
obtain Board jurisdiction unless the amounts were doubled. But
it seems doubtful that mere inflation could have justified that in-
crease, or that this was the sole basis of decision. Certainly the
opinion of the Board in the Breeding Transfer Co. case,' which
explained the 1954 standards, lays considerable emphasis upon the
budgetary restrictions under which the Board operates, and the
problem of controlling its caseload so that it might give more at-
tention to important cases.'' In dissent Member Murdock argued
that the motivating factor in the decision to restrict jurisdiction
was a desire to reallocate authority between the federal and state
186. LMRDA § 701(c)(1), quoted in full at text accompanying note 151 supra.
187. See Siemons Mailing Serv., 122 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 43 L.R.R.M. 1056, 1058
(Nov. 14, 1958); Breeding Transfer Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 493, 494 (1954); Hollow Tree
Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 635, 636 (1950).
188. Harlan B. Browning, 120 N.L.R.B. 841 (1958) (association); T. H. Rogers
Lumber Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 1732 (1957) (multiplant enterprise); 23 NLRB ANN.
REP. 8 (1958).
189. NLRB v. Associated Musicians, Local 802, 226 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1955);
Teamsters Union, Local 554 (McAllister Transfer Co.) 110 N.L.R.B. 1769 (1954).
190. 110 N.L.R.B. 493 (1954).
191. Id. at 497.
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governments in the regulation of labor relations, citing the state-
ments made by the then Chairman of the NLRB and one other
member of the Board." 2 However, the majority expressly denied
that any desire to broaden state jurisdiction was a factor in its
decision. 3 In announcing its 1958 modifications, the Board openly
acknowledged that the change was motivated largely by the Su-
preme Court's decision in Guss, and was an attempt to reduce as
much as feasible the no man's land area."' And it again referred to
the limitations of budget and administrative efficiency in justifying
the failure to completely encompass the no man's land. 95
On the basis of this background, Congress must have been aware
of factors other than mere impact upon commerce which might
enter into a Board determination to extend further its jurisdiction.
Indeed, Senator Kennedy indicated that in his opinion the exten-
tion of jurisdiction might be justified not on the basis of obstruction
of commerce per se but upon the denial by state courts and agen-
cies of the protection of those rights recognized by the federal act
"which all of us believe all American working people and employers
in these states have . ,, 196 It is arguable that the denial of pro-
tection of the collective bargaining process and its participants
or neutrals drawn into a labor dispute, may create an impact upon
commerce different from that where the state courts and agencies
provide some relief comparable to that available under the federal
act. However, the emphasis of the Senator seems to be on the pro-
tection of collective bargaining and the rights of workers more than
upon the protection of commerce from interference. While it is true
that possible interference with commercial activity arising from
labor disputes has played no small part in motivating Congress in
its enactment of labor legislation, of equal importance in the initial
Wagner Act was the desire to protect the economic well-being of
vorkers through the device of collective bargaining. This is evi-
denced by the reference to the imbalance of power in the initial
versions of the policy section of the act, 19 and the statements of
members of the legislature. 98 The addition of a paragraph dealing
with the direct impact upon commerce seems to have been moti-
vated more by a desire to avoid unconstitutionality than a primary
192. Id. at 501-03.
193. Id. at 497.
194. Siemons Mailing Sew., 122 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 43 L.R.R.M. 1056, 1057 (Nov.
14, 1958).
195. Ibid.
196. 105 CONG. REc. 16417 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1959).
197. S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1935) (original Senate Print); S. 2926,
78d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1934).
198. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1935); 79 CoNG. REc. 6183 (1935)
(speech by Senator Wagner).
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concern for the free flow of goods.'9 9 An impact on commerce may
come from denial to a substantial number of employees of an op-
portunity to bargain effectively for adequate compensation so that
the potential consumption of goods is restricted. It may also arise
from pressures brought to bear upon individual employers which
compel them to give up their livelihood or operations. In fact, the
argument well may be made that "commerce," as used in its con-
stitutional sense, has become almost synonymous with "national
economy," and that any labor dispute which may interfere with the
national economic stability may "affect commerce." This may be so
because of a cumulative effect of many labor disputes rather than
the effect of a single dispute considered alone. If collective bargain-
ing fails to operate effectively over a large portion of small busi-
nesses, it may have a substantial impact upon the national economy.
If abuse of economic power is common in an area of the economy
over which the NLRB does not currently exercise jurisdiction, this
may have an impact upon the economy which would merit an ex-
tension of such jurisdiction. What I am suggesting, then, is that in
evaluating the desirability of an extension of the NLRB's jurisdic-
tion, it is appropriate to consider the questions of whether federal
regulation is necessary for the protection of collective bargaining
in "small business," and whether federal protection against abuses
of economic power by either labor or management is necessary in
esmall business."
In defining the "small business" which would not meet the exist-
ing standards of the NLRB, reference might be made to the facts
of two critical cases in the development of the no man's land: Guss
and Garmon II. In the Guss case, the employer manufactured spe-
cialized equipment for the Air Force, receiving from out of state
goods and materials amounting to "a little less than $50,000," and
shipping out of state goods under contract with the Air Forc6
amounting to $146,000. Its labor force was twenty to thirty em-
ployees.200 This would suggest that a manufacturer most of whose
product remained within the state might be below the Board's
standards even though he had as many as twenty to thirty em-
ployees. However, the employer in Garmon II would now be within
the Board's jurisdiction since the company had gross sales of over
$500,000, and received goods from out of state in the amount of
$200,000 to $250,000, although it had only eight employees. 201 This
suggests that a business which does not come within the Board's
199. H.R. REnP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1935).
200. Record, pp. 2, 12-13, Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).




jurisdiction is also likely to have very few employees. Of course,
these may not be typical "small businesses" but in view of the pres-
ent 'low" standards of the Board- $50,000 of goods flowing either
into, or out of, the state in the case of a manufacturing or nonretail
business, and $500,000 gross sales in the case of a retail business -
it seems likely that we are dealing with a situation in which the
marginal employer who would come within the jurisdiction of the
Board if it were to be extended slightly downward will have a
worlforce of some five to ten employees. The "small business" is
likely to be operated by one or two individuals as employer, and to
engage in largely a localized business.
If factors other than the immediate impact upon commerce (or
flow of goods) of labor disputes involving a particular group or
class of employers may be considered in determining the advisabil-
ity of extending federal jurisdiction further into the area of small
business, what relevant factors might appropriately be considered?
What follows is less an attempt to make a definitive resolution of
this question, and the original question as to whether such exten-
sion should occur, than to point up some significant considerations.
Is extension of federal jurisdiction necessary to protect the insti-
tution of collective bargaining and to assure its effective operation
in the area of small business? We begin with the premise that col-
lective bargaining is a desirable institution- at least the policy of
the federal government20 2 and some state governments2 03 over a
substantial period of years makes the premise an acceptable one.
In evaluating the desirability of governmental intervention to pro-
tect the institution of collective bargaining in small business, we can
consider its claimed benefits: (a) creating and maintaining a more
equitable balance of bargaining power between employees and their
employers, and (b) providing mechanisms for the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes concerning wages, hours and working conditions.
So far as the desirability of encouraging collective bargaining by
government intervention depends upon the relative inequality of the
202. The protection from anti-trust prosecution which the Clayton Act purportedly
granted to "the existence and operation of labor ... organizations, instituted for
the purposes of mutual help, . . .lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects there-
of ..." (38 Stat. 73 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1958)), is apparently the first official
federal recognition of such a policy. The practices of the War Labor Board during
World War I, the Railway Labor Act of 1926, the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932,
and the Wagner Act of 1935, are perhaps the more familiar pronouncements of the
federal policy favoring collective bargaining.
203. Enactments of anti-injunction laws in Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin, together
with labor relations acts in some of these states (see note 144 supra), indicate that




bargaining power of employer and individual employees, the argu-
ment in favor of extension of jurisdiction may be weakened as the
employment unit becomes smaller. The loss of one or two employees
may be far more critical to a business which has only ten persons in
its labor force, than to a larger corporation. Moreover, the individual
employee may find relatively good opportunities for other employ-
ment when the type of business in which he is involved is small
manufacturing or retail, since there may be several similar firms
operating in the vicinity. On the other hand, the employer is not
without some advantage, since he may be in a better position than
the large corporate employer to make a complete turnover of his
labor force, and in many cases the individual employee may face
competition from the employer himself or members of his family
who can replace the worker or supplant him at reduced cost to the
employer. There is perhaps more personal contract between the
employer and his employees in the small business, but this is no
particular assurance against arbitrary discharge or refusal on the
part of the employer to deal with his employees on a collective basis.
While recognition of the right of employees to engage in col-
lective activity for the purpose of compelling bargaining about
wages, hours and conditions of employment may be spreading
through the state courts, in the sense that they may no longer treat
strikers or picketers as "conspirators" and "tortfeasors" to the ex-
tent that they did in the nineteenth century, the large majority of
states still fail to provide protection against the employer's coercive
tactics designed to break up and defeat organization of his em-
ployees. Moreover, even though a state lacking a comprehensive
labor relations act might undertake to provide some protection
against "unfair practices" by employers, the absence of any mech-
anism for settling disputes as to an appropriate unit for bargaining
or concerning conduct of an election to ascertain the existence of a
representative of a majority of the employees in a bargaining unit,
tends to discourage the most effective operation of collective bar-
gaining. Unless some administrative agency deals with this problem,
it seems unlikely that a complete effectuation of a policy favoring
collective bargaining is possible. Courts are already overburdened
in many states with personal injury litigation, domestic relations
problems, and the serious problems of juvenile delinquency. More-
over, a court, with its emphasis on the adversary procedure, may
not be equipped to deal with such questions as (1) what is an ap-
propriate bargaining unit; (2) when it is appropriate to conduct a
representation election in a plant where a collective bargaining
agreement has already been set up; and (3) whether conduct of
employer or labor representative is such as to require an election
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to be set aside because of the probability that it is not a fair rep-
resentation of employee free choice. Moreover, most courts lack
the machinery to hold and supervise an election such as the NLRB
or a state labor conciliator normally conducts.
The past reluctance of most states to enact a comprehensive regu-
latory system for collective bargaining makes a sudden introduc-
tion of such a system unlikely in many states. In the absence of such
intervention by government, collective bargaining is dependent
upon voluntary acquiescence by employers or the use of economic
isolation of the employer by the union or his employees, or even
resort to coercion of a noneconomic type. If collective bargaining
is a desirable means of conducting industrial relations, it seems
further desirable to institute the bargaining process with as little
"warfare" and as little disruption of the business itself as is possible.
Therefore, unless more states adopt statutes which give some mini-
mum protections to collective agreements and provide for rep-
resentation proceedings, the argument for extension of federal
jurisdiction may be persuasive.
Is extension of federal jurisdiction desirable to provide protection
against abuses of power by the participants in collective bargain-
ing? As Congress has determined in both the Taft-Hartley Act and
in the recent legislation, it may not be enough to provide protec-
tion against employer coercion and to attempt to make the selection
of a collective bargaining representative a peaceful one. Unions
may engage in conduct which is unduly detrimental to employers
and their employees, and ultimately to the public itself, through the
use of union security agreements, 204 secondary pressures, 20 5 and
other coercive tactics. 0 6 In fact, the disclosures of the McClellan
Committee suggest that one of the more lucrative areas for abuse
of union power may be in the situation of the small business enter-
prise which the union can coerce through the use of picket lines,
"unfair lists" and secondary boycotts.20 7
It may be argued that protection is in fact available under state
laws, since absent federal control the state courts could intervene
to give injunctive and compensatory relief to those threatened by
stranger or minority picketing, discriminatory hiring practices and
204. LMRA § 8(a)(3), 8(b)(2), 61 Stat. 140, 141, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3),
(b)(2) (1952).
205. LMRA § 8(b)(4)(B), as amended LMRDA § 704(a).
206. LMRA §§ 8(b)(1), (2), (3), (4)(C), (4)(D), (5), (6), (7) & 8(d), 61 Stat.
140-42 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(1), (2), (3), (4)(C), (4)(D), (5), (6), &
158(d) (1952), as amended LMRDA §§ 704(a), (c).
207. 105 CoNG. REc. 5764 (daily ed. April 21, 1959); Select Committee on Im-
proper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, Interim Report, S. REP. No.
1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 452-53 (1958).
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conditions of employment, and secondary pressures. But this over-
looks, for example, that in some states, unions which attain repre-
sentation status may discriminate against minorities without legal
sanction,2 8 and that the closed shop and picketing to obtain the
closed shop is protected activity under some state laws.20 9
It seems fairly clear, therefore, that if a policy favoring collective
bargaining is desirable, and if protection against the abuses of eco-
nomic power and the collective bargaining process is necessary, the
extension of NLRB jurisdiction may presently be the most effective
means for accomplishing these objectives-and perhaps the only
effective means.
Is such extension likely to be unduly detrimental to small business
and those participating in it? Some apparent detriment may arise
from the encouragement of collective bargaining which results in
demands for higher wages and more favorable working conditions,
tending toward standards comparable to those found in larger in-
dustry. It is possible that an employer with a limited market and
a relatively narrow profit margin may find increased labor costs
unbearable. Similarly, he may feel that the introduction of col-
lective bargaining into his business deprives him of necessary man-
agement control. It should be noted, however, that the introduction
of collective bargaining, even though conducted through affiliates
of national unions, does not necessarily require that wages and
working conditions must be the same in large and small industry.
Certainly if the demands of labor are such as to drive employers
from the market, this defeats the immediate interest of their em-
ployees, although it may ultimately protect the interests of em-
ployees of larger competitors. In some industries where the stand-
ard unit of operation is small and the business highly competitive,
unionization may even protect the small employer from ruinous
competition.21 ° Indeed, an argument may be made that business
enterprises whose continued operation is dependent upon the pay-
ment of "substandard" wages and the maintenance of poor work-
ing conditions relative to the major portion of the economy may
208. Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 245 Ala. 113, 16 So. 2d 416 (1944), rev'd,
323 U.S. 192 (1944); Ross v. Ebert, 275 Wis. 523, 82 N.W.2d 315 (1957).
209. See note 168 supra.
210. Perhaps the most notable example of union-management cooperation which
has resulted in the betterment of the economic position of the individual small
employer is in the garment industry. See BARBAsH, THE PRACTIcE OF UNIoNIsm 375-
77 (1956); Myers & Bloch, Men's Clothing, How COLLECTIvE BARGAINING WOlKs
381-449, particularly 446-47 (Millis ed. 1942). But cooperation in other areas has
also resulted in economic advantage to the employer. See GOLDEN & RuTTENBERc,
DYNAmcs OF INDusTRIAL DEMOcRACY 233-91 (9th ed. 1942); WmLLumsoN & HArt-
Ris, TRENDs IN COLLEcTiVE BARGAINING 130-41 (1945).
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not be the sort of enterprises which we should encourage or protect
against the pressures of collective bargaining.
But perhaps the most persuasive argument on this point is that
if small business is a likely field for organization by large unions,
the organization is going to occur in spite of federal or state pro-
tection of collective bargaining, and may well occur through co-
ercive techniques. The dangers to the small businessman of having
no adequate protection from government seem to counterbalance
the potential danger of economic losses resulting from collective
bargaining.
Would any such extension be detrimental to the persons presently
subject to Board jurisdiction? The Board, in the Siemons Mailing
Ser. 21 decision, suggested that any further extension of its jurisdic-
tion might reduce its effectiveness as an instrumentality of federal
policy in the areas in which it is already operating. Nothing in the
legislative history of the LMRDA suggests that Congress had any
desire to imperil the effective enforcement of federal policy in the
larger businesses of America. In fact there is every reason to believe
that an improvement in operation is desired," '1 and that a reduction
in the time now devoted to unfair labor practice charges and repre-
sentation proceedings would be as important as an extension of
federal law into more areas of the national economy.
Finally, may not the desirability of maintaining a substantial area
of local control mitigate against such extension? This is the point
made persuasively by Professors Cox and Wellington when they
emphasize that ours is a federal system of government and that
some local autonomy is necessary for the most effective operation
of that system.2"' Local control may be more responsive to the will
of the people than control by an agency in Washington far removed
from the immediate scene of the labor dispute, even though the
latter is equipped with regional offices to which extensive power
may be delegated.
In spite of the protests of the majority in the Breeding Transfer
Co. case,214 this factor may appropriately be considered by the
NLRB. It appears to have found some favor in Congress, since the
supporters of the final provision emphasized the desirability of local
211. 122 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 43 L.R.R.M. 1056, 1057 (Nov. 14, 1958).
212. See, e.g., the provisions for delegation of power to regional directors, and
giving priority to certain charges. LMRDA §§ 701(b), 706.
213. Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HAzv. L. REV. 1297,
1305 (1954); Wellington, Labor and the Federal System, 26 U. Cm. L. Rmv. 542,
543 (1959). See also Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress and State Jurisdiction
over Labor Relations I, 59 COLUmr. L. REv. 6, 21 (1959).
214. 110 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1954).
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control of local labor affairs. 215 Perhaps in the end, this will be the
decisive factor against the extension of federal jurisdiction. The
loss of "uniformity" may have no major impact upon the national
economy, and some loss of "industrial democracy" may be offset
by a more significant democracy of local autonomy in matters hav-
ing their most immediate impact on the locality. If collective bar-
gaining is as meritorious as Congress and many authorities believe
it is, it should win the support of state government as it has of
national government.
Congress has chosen to solve the problem of the no man's land
not by defining with precision the limits of federal power over
labor relations and returning to the states a definite area for regu-
lation, but by leaving the matter in the hands of the NLRB, with
the proviso that if the effect upon commerce of labor relations of a
certain class of employers is insubstantial, the Board may decline
to exercise jurisdiction and thereby permit the states to do so. It
seems likely that the outer limit of actual Board jurisdiction will also
be the outer limit of federal law. Whether that limit will go beyond
the lines drawn by the Board in 1958, and defined as the minimum
federal jurisdiction by Congress in 1959, is a matter which cannot
be resolved here. What I have attempted to do is to formulate some
factors which should be relevant to a determination of the proper
limits of federal regulation of labor relations and to suggest that
these, as well as the immediate impact upon commerce of a dispute
in a given business or class of businesses, are appropriate for Board
consideration in the future.
215. H.R. REP. No. 741, Dissenting Views, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1959).
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